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The Presidential Election in Illinois: 2016 
Compared to 2012 and 2008 
By:  John S. Jackson    Paul Simon Public Policy Institute 
 
Abstract 
 This paper describes and analyzes the 2016 general election results in 
Illinois and compares those results to the 2012 and 2008 presidential elections.  
The primary unit of analysis in this paper is the 102 counties in Illinois and the 
aggregate vote results at the state and county level.  Those aggregate data voting 
returns are supplemented with statewide survey data taken from the Paul Simon 
Institute’s periodic polls which allows an individual voter level of analysis to add 
to the aggregate data.  
The paper also takes account of modern political science’s developing 
narrative about what is happening geographically inside individual states and 
nationally in an era of deep partisan and ideological polarization coupled with the 
long term effects of the realignment of the nation’s two major parties and the 
recurring political map which has evolved over the past three decades. The 
interaction and tension between the popular vote and the Electoral College vote 
was the dominant and determining feature of the 2016 election results.  No other 
modern democracy has a national election system comparable to our use of the 
Electoral College as the final arbiter of who will be elected to the most powerful 
office in the world.  The election of 2016 produced a disparity between the 
Electoral College and the popular vote and it was the second time this occurred 
out of the five presidential elections held in the 21st Century.  This time, the 
discrepancy between the two outcomes was the largest in American history.  This 
disparity makes an even more salient and compelling story than what would have 
already been a dramatic tale of the epic battle between Hillary Clinton and Donald 
Trump. They were two of the most diametrically different candidates to ever seek 
the American presidency and archetypes of the life-long political professional 
versus the totally inexperienced newcomer and outsider both of which are 
becoming the norm in other battles for governor, senator and mayor across the 
United States.    
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Introduction 
Hillary Clinton 
 Hillary Clinton is a native daughter of Illinois and the first woman to gain 
the presidential nomination of a major American party.  She was born in Chicago 
and raised in Park Ridge a middle class suburb of Chicago, she finished high school 
before going off to Wellesley for college. She then attended law school at Yale 
where she met Bill Clinton.  After law school she followed Bill Clinton to his native 
Arkansas where they both taught at the University of Arkansas School of Law in 
Fayetteville from which he launched his political career and climb to state and 
then national office.   Hillary Clinton’s political career was built first in Arkansas 
for eighteen years and then in Washington, D. C. for eight years as First Lady in Bill 
Clinton’s two administrations (Clinton, 2003).   
Clinton then struck out on her own right, moving to New York in 2000 and 
winning the Senate seat there vacated by Daniel Patrick Moynihan.  She won a 
second term in 2006 by a sixty-seven percent margin.  Soon thereafter Clinton 
launched her own bid to win the Democratic nomination for president in 2008.  
She lost that nomination race after a long, contentious and protracted struggle 
with Barack Obama, also from Illinois, who not only bested Clinton in the primary 
contest but also went on to beat Republican John McCain in the general election 
of 2008 (See: Jackson, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2013 and other books on 2008 
including, Heilmann and Halperin, 2010, Balz and Johnson, 2009; Ceaser, Busch, 
and Pitney, 2009; Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, 2008).  
Clinton then took on a larger role on the national stage in 2009 when 
President Obama offered her the position of Secretary of State in his first 
administration, one of the four most important cabinet positions in any 
administration.  At the time Obama’s offer to Clinton to be his Secretary of State 
led many observers to draw comparisons with that other famous Illinois 
president, Abraham Lincoln, when he assembled his first cabinet from “A Team of 
Rivals” (Kerns Goodman, 2005).  
As Secretary of State, Clinton’s political reach and her personal image and 
brand were then burnished, and ultimately bruised, by those four very high 
profile years as the nation’s most senior diplomat and a leading voice especially 
for women and children on the world stage.  When she left that office in 2013 
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65% of Americans held a favorable image of her (The Economist, October 22,   
2016, 22).  Her standing with world opinion was similarly high as polls taken in 
other nations found her to be one of the most admired women in the world.  
Two years later she launched another bid to gain the Democratic 
nomination and the White House.  By then several highly publicized and 
contentious public hearings had been held by the Congress on the Benghazi 
tragedy where four Americans, including the U. S. Ambassador to Libya, Chris 
Stevens, had died. Clinton’s critics examined the incident in minute detail with 
probing questions about the State Department and Clinton’s personal 
involvement in that tragedy.  As one of the ancillary results of those hearings 
Clinton’s favorable ratings declined precipitously in the wake of the constant 
drumbeat of negative publicity directed toward her.  She began her quest for the 
Democratic nomination and run for the White House with a long history of public 
service and accomplishments but also carrying a load of political and personal 
baggage as well.   
 This paper will attempt to analyze how Clinton was able to build on the 
Obama record and coalition in Illinois, a state where they both could claim 
political roots and a state which has repeatedly been found to be one of the most 
typical in the nation (Ohlemacher, 2007). It will also show how Clinton’s victory in 
Illinois in 2012, when compared to Obama’s wins in 2008 and 2012, illustrates 
graphically both the strengths and weaknesses of both major parties in Illinois and 
throughout the United States as the nation contemplates a new era of unified 
Republican control under the leadership of Donald Trump.  A basic contention of 
this paper is that the Clinton/Trump results in Illinois are a template for what 
happened in the entire nation in the 2016 presidential election.  In addition, the 
trends which have been underway in Illinois at least since the turn of the 21st 
Century and the election of 2000 came to full fruition in the 2016 results and 
indicate quite cogently what is also happening in the nation as a whole.  In short, 
Illinois is a bellwether and its politics an algorithm for understanding the electoral 
tides which moved the country to elect Trump president with 304 Electoral 
College votes while Clinton received a popular vote margin of almost 3 million 
votes (Calfas, December 20, 2016).  This paper will explore and attempt to explain 
how that anomalous result occurred and what it says about the deep divisions 
which exist in American politics today.   
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Donald Trump 
Donald J. Trump became the Republican Party’s nominee after a brutal and 
hard fought battle which started with seventeen major candidates declared for 
the Republican nomination.  He, of course, also went on to become the 45th 
president of the United States.  One could hardly have scripted a more 
improbable scenario for Trump’s march to the nomination and then the 
presidency.  Trump’s competitors included both sitting governors Chris Christie, 
from New Jersey, John Kasich, of Ohio, and Scott Walker of Wisconsin and former 
governors Jeb Bush of Florida, Mike Huckabee, of Arkansas, George Pataki of New 
York, Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, and James Gilmore of Virginia.  (Most of this 
section is taken from an earlier paper I did on the nominations process.  See: 
Jackson, 2015).  It also included most prominently, several young and ambitious 
first term senators, Ted Cruz of Texas, Marco Rubio of Florida and Rand Paul of 
Kentucky.  The only veteran U.S. Senator running was Lindsay Graham whose 
campaign had a hard time getting started and did not last long.  From the private 
sector there were two newcomers beside Trump, Ben Carson a retired 
neurosurgeon from Ohio and Carly Fiorina, a business woman from California.  
The three candidates who had no prior governmental experience ran on 
their business and professional achievements.  They also pledged to “run 
government like a business,” which is an always popular mantra in American 
politics no matter how unrealistic and inappropriate the analogy may be (Joyce, 
December 14, 2016). Of those three, however, two fell by the wayside rather 
early while Trump rode a wave of alleged voter anger and desire for a change to a 
most unlikely victory, first in the nominations contest against mostly veteran 
Republican opposition and then against Clinton, arguably the candidate with the 
most high level governmental experience in the modern era of presidential 
politics.  This paper tells the story of how Clinton won Illinois, but it also tells the 
obverse side of the coin, that is how Trump won the country while losing most of 
the urban areas and many of the big states like Illinois. The big urban Rust Belt 
states that Trump won, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, were keys 
to his victory.  Those states resemble Illinois in their basic geographic and 
demographic patterns although the Democrats retained Illinois while failing in 
those other very similar states. 
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The perennial narrative of the American people being ‘fed up” with 
Washington and longing for an “outsider” not from Washington, was advanced 
early and often by all of the candidates who were not currently in federal office 
and repeated faithfully and uncritically by the mass media.  No one delivered that 
message better than Trump who rode to victory on his pledge to “drain the 
swamp” of Washington if he was elected.  Most pundits and those who study 
presidential campaigns failed to recognize just how virulent this quest for an 
outsider, or a change agent, would turn out to be first in the nominations race 
and then in the general election. 
The media and all the Republican candidates talked a lot about the desire 
for a change and the anger of some Americans although just what they were 
supposed to be angry about was ill-defined. The nest of issues related to 
globalization of the economy, loss of American jobs because of international 
trade, and fear of immigrants usually topped the list.  Fear of domestic terrorism 
was also a major issue and that fear was intimately tangled up with the 
immigration control issue. Trump seized on these themes and developed a motto 
promising to “Make America Great Again” and a complete narrative around how 
being tough in general and being smart and aggressive in negotiations with our 
allies and enemies alike could accomplish that promise.   
This narrative about how the nation was weak and falling behind our 
competitors for a lack of good leadership found a responsive popular audience 
and carried Trump through the Republican primaries and the general election 
contest with Clinton all the way to the Oval Office.  He was the most 
unconventional and inexperienced candidate to win the nomination of a major 
party, let alone the presidency, in American history.  This paper explores how 
Trump  won it all nationally while losing to Clinton in Illinois and what this pattern 
of wins and losses tells us about the shape of the divided electorate and polarized 
American politics here near the end of the second decade of the 21st Century. 
Trump was a real estate entrepreneur who had inherited a small fortune 
from his father (The remainder of this section taken from Jackson, 2016, 11).  He 
parlayed that inheritance into a much larger real estate empire making his 
signature “Trump” name a landmark on many high profile trophy properties in 
New York City, Atlantic City, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.  He 
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often boasted about how rich he was as proof of his business acumen.  He 
variously reported his net worth to be between eight and ten billion dollars 
although there were questions raised in the media about just how he had 
calculated those figures and how accurate they were. There was no log cabin to 
penthouse mythology in Trump’s appeal although he claimed the Populist mantle 
quite successfully in the end.  One might think that a billionaire real estate 
developer who lived in a palatial tower bearing his name in large letters on Fifth 
Avenue in New York would be an unlikely hero for working class and rural 
America; however, that is exactly what happened.    
Trump also developed the image and persona of being somewhat of a 
character with his flamboyant orange hair permanently fixed in a painfully 
obvious comb over that became the butt of endless late night comics’ jokes.  His 
stints as a reality television impresario, especially with his show “The Apprentice” 
made him a familiar figure on American television, which is one of the most 
important assets all candidates seek.  When it comes to a recognizable name 
brand and a well-developed image, hurdles which are very hard to clear for many 
candidates, Donald Trump already had those obstacles covered when he officially 
entered the race on June 16, 2015.   
Trump was at the head of the class of “non-politicians” who sought the 
nomination in 2016, and who often pop up and then fade quickly in presidential 
and governors races.  However Trump did not fade.  On the contrary the longer 
he ran the stronger he got.  That was true in the primaries and then became true 
again in the general election which ended with him being elected on November 
8th as the 45th president of the United States.  When he won the Republican 
nomination he had beaten sixteen other candidates, most of whom were well 
known and experienced political leaders with many years of public service and 
several high level elected offices on their records.  When he won the presidency 
he beat Hillary Clinton who had been a national figure for twenty five years and a 
First Lady, Senator from New York, and Secretary of State in the first Obama 
administration.  No more improbable set of accomplishments could have been 
imagined when this election season began in 2015.   
Clinton and Obama in Illinois 
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One premise of this paper is that a careful comparison of the Clinton and 
Obama races in Illinois will be instructive in analyzing the prospects of both major 
parties in Illinois and the nation.  The Democrats lost the presidential race and 
with it any hope of controlling Congress in November of 2016 and ultimately will 
lose the control of the Supreme Court as well.  The Republicans now have the 
luxury of unified control of the entire federal government and with that virtually 
complete power over all three branches of American government for the 
foreseeable future. The Democratic Party’s future is now much debated and 
speculated about as they try to accommodate to the new power equation in 
Washington and to their status as the loyal opposition.   
It is always difficult for a party to attain a third consecutive term and it has 
only happened four times since the turn of the 20th Century, i.e. in 1908, 1928, 
1940, and 1988 (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 239-241).  The barrier against third 
terms for the same party is so great it constitutes one of the most important 
variables in the various formulas that political scientists use in constructing 
statistical models of who will win the presidency and what the most important 
causal factors are (Abromowitz, 2016). In many respects as Obama acknowledged 
while campaigning for Clinton in September of 2016, a first Clinton term would 
help validate Obama’s two terms and constitute something of a referendum on 
his record. As he and First Lady Michelle Obama campaigned enthusiastically for 
Clinton, it was evident that they considered a victory for her to be an important 
part of his legacy.  At minimum a Clinton victory would provide much more 
continuity than the dramatic changes which would inevitably come with a Trump 
presidency.   
 This study is an extension of two earlier papers I published in The Simon 
Review series on the Obama victories in Illinois in 2008 and 2012 (Jackson, 2009; 
2013).  It is also an extension of another longer term research program I have 
pursued since 1972 covering all the presidential primaries, conventions and 
general elections since the beginning of the reform era in presidential politics 
(Jackson, 2015).  These papers and that book, which are filled with longitudinal 
data, attempt to document what has happened in Illinois, one of the most typical 
states, a microcosm of the nation and a bellwether of the national political trends 
in an era marked by growing partisan and ideological polarization and the 
resulting gridlock in our state and national politics.   
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 Hillary Clinton’s rise to political fame and power is in many ways very 
conventional and illustrates the typical path to the White House which has been 
taken in the past by the many other ambitious politicians who have become 
major party nominees.  She is the kind of experienced and seasoned political 
leader who frequently seeks the keys to the White House from a power base in 
the upper reaches of power in national politics.   
Of course, she is also quite different in that she is the first woman and the 
first former First Lady to seek and win a major party nomination in the two 
hundred and twenty seven years of American presidential history. From that 
distinction she will always have a firm place in American history as an 
accomplished Illinois native. In that sense she also resembles Obama who was a 
pioneer in similar respects as the nation’s first African American president.  
Clinton’s and Obama’s political odyssey are something of the mirror images of 
each other. Obama was born in Hawaii and then settled in Illinois after graduation 
from Columbia University.  He built his political career with grassroots community 
organizing on the south side of Chicago and then service in the Illinois State 
Senate for eight years (Jackson, 2009).   
Clinton’s political path is more like that of fellow Illinois native, Ronald 
Reagan, who was born in Illinois but left the state as a young man to travel, first 
to Iowa and then to California where he built his political career as a two term 
governor before winning the presidency in 1980 and 1984.  Both Abraham Lincoln 
and Ulysses S. Grant were elected from Illinois but were born in Kentucky and 
Ohio respectively. Adlai Stevenson was Governor of Illinois for two terms when he 
won the Democratic nomination and ran against Dwight Eisenhower in both 1952 
and 1956, but he lost both of those elections and even failed to carry Illinois both 
times. So, Clinton’s electoral record is most like Stevenson’s although she did 
manage to carry her native state handily, as did Obama before her (Stanley and 
Niemi, 2013, 239-241).  
 In building their political base and attaining the party’s nomination and 
then the presidency, however, Clinton and Obama’s victories in Illinois were very 
similar in ways which illuminate the continuity in Illinois and national politics.  
Their political support base, and the opposition which they encountered and 
engendered, are similar and are very indicative of the deeply polarized politics in 
10 
 
both the state and nation which has been the hallmarks of modern American 
politics, especially since the turn of the Twenty-First Century.   
 Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have been at the vanguard of the major 
demographic and political changes taking place in American politics during the 
first two decades of the 21st Century, and their candidacies are marked by 
significant continuity from 2008 to 2016. We will look at the continuity and the 
change in the voting data from Illinois over those three presidential elections 
which have seen Illinois presidential candidates running in the eye of the political 
maelstrom during this turbulent and fascinating era in our nation’s politics.   
The Data Analysis 
The Aggregate Data Analysis 
          The first thing that seems most notable about the 2016 results in Illinois is 
how handily Clinton won the statewide vote and electoral vote.  If Illinois had 
been the clear national bellwether we usually are, she would be managing her 
transition team and organizing her government now.  In addition, the Democrats 
would probably have control of the Senate although the Republicans would have 
undoubtedly continued to control the House. 
 Instead, Trump and the Republicans won the Electoral College vote by a 
seventy-seven vote margin although Clinton won the popular vote.  In that 
respect Illinois followed the national trends, although the Clinton margin in Illinois 
was significantly larger than it was nationwide. Clinton won 55.8% of the popular 
vote compared to Trump’s 38.8% in Illinois (Illinois State Board of Elections, 
2016).  However she only won a plurality of roughly 2.8 million popular votes, or 
48.2 % to 46.6% of the national total (Calfas, December 20, 2016).   
The Democrats picked up one of only two Senate seats they netted 
nationally when Tammy Duckworth unseated incumbent Republican Mark Kirk by 
a healthy margin of 55% to 40% (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016).  In 
addition, the Democrats also added one U.S. House seat when Brad Schneider 
beat Republican incumbent Robert Dold in the tenth district, a northern suburban 
seat including parts of Cook and Lake Counties.  In spite of the national victory for 
Trump, the Illinois Republicans did not take away any incumbent Democratic U. S. 
House seats. This is partially because all the remaining seats in Illinois were pretty 
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reliably in a red or blue district since the state is so polarized geographically as is 
the nation based on the partisan gerrymandering which occurred after the 2010 
Census. Unlike the gerrymandering in the nation as a whole which strongly 
favored the Republicans, the new Illinois map drawn after the 2010 census 
favored the Democrats.   
The trend toward statewide victories for the Democrats in Illinois continued 
with Susana Mendoza taking the Comptroller’s office away from Republican Leslie 
Munger by a 49.4% to 44.4% margin (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016).  
Thus, at the presidential level, U.S. Senate level, the Comptroller level, and to a 
lesser extent the U. S. House level the Democrats did well in Illinois on November 
8th.  
The night was not a total loss for Illinois Republicans, however, since they 
gained a net of four Illinois House seats and a net of two Illinois Senate seats.  The 
proxy war between Governor Bruce Rauner and his nemesis, Speaker of the 
House Michael J. Madigan was close to a toss-up with a small margin going to the 
Governor.  Both sides spent unprecedented amounts of money, but the Governor 
and the Republicans almost doubled the total spent by the Democrats.  While 
Speaker Madigan, lost his nominal super majority, he still controlled 67 seats and 
Senate President John Cullerton controlled 37 seats in the Illinois Senate.  While 
the nation was going for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton by a majority of the 
Electoral College votes Republicans in Illinois had much to celebrate about their 
national victory, however the overall results in Illinois must have been something 
of a disappointment to them after all the money which had been spent on their 
behalf left the General Assembly in firm control of the Democrats.  With the 2018 
statewide elections now looming, however, the Republican Party showed real 
strength in 2016 which they could build on in 2018 especially with Governor 
Rauner at the head of their ticket and with the amounts of campaign money he 
has access to.     
Next we are going to view the map of Illinois from a more micro 
perspective.  That is, we move from the statewide view to the county as the level 
of analysis.  Illinois has 102 counties and it stretches from the Wisconsin border 
on the north to Kentucky and Missouri on the south and from Iowa to Indiana on 
the west and east.  It is made up of small towns, small to medium sized cities and 
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vast rural areas, which constitute northern, central, western, and southern 
Illinois.  
 Illinois also encompasses the crowded city of Chicago and the growing 
suburbs of Cook and the five Collar Counties in the northeast.  Cook County alone 
contains a total of 41% of the population of the state with 21% being inside of the 
city and 20% being outside in suburban Cook. The five Collar Counties of Lake, 
McHenry, Kane, DuPage, and Will make up 24% of the total.  They are also where 
the most growth is occurring in Illinois. The five collar counties plus suburban 
Cook and the City of Chicago are collectively called “Chicagoland,” and together 
they constitute 65% of the state’s total population. The remaining 96 counties of 
“Downstate” account for 35% of the Illinois population.  Consequently, if a 
candidate can win the City of Chicago, and a sizeable block of the suburbs, he or 
she can pretty well count on a statewide victory even without much help from the 
other ninety-six of the Downstate Counties.  
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The fact that Clinton won Cook and the suburbs (except for the exurban 
county of McHenry) so strongly, and added to this total another seven mostly 
large counties allowed her to score the comfortable victory she enjoyed in her 
native state. Clinton won the counties which contain nine out of the top ten cities 
in population size.  The only exception to her large county victories was 
Sangamon County and Springfield, the state capital. Of the seven other counties 
Clinton won, three, DeKalb, Champaign and Jackson, contain major state 
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universities.  The others are home to small to medium sized cities and urban areas 
(Winnebago on the Wisconsin border in the far north with Rockford as its center, 
Rock Island and the Quad Cities, Peoria, the home of Caterpillar and Bradley 
University and St. Clair in the urban Metro-East area with Belleville as its biggest 
city).    
However, the fact that Trump won 90 total counties, covering a very large 
percentage of the total geography of the state, is indicative of his much larger 
victory tallied in the whole United States with sizable majorities in the Outstate 
regions (See Appendix A; also, Barone, December 15, 2016).  As one can see from 
Appendix B, the total map of Illinois looks like a sea of red with a large blue land 
mass quite evident in northeastern Illinois and a few islands of blue widely 
interspersed throughout the rest of the state.  It was Trump and his supporters 
who woke up excited and savoring victory on November 9th and Clinton and her 
supporters who woke up with a hangover, demoralized and depressed and 
wondering what just happened.   
This paper provides a part of the answer even though it is based on Illinois a 
blue state where Clinton won handily.  The places she won, and the other places 
and groups that provided the Trump victory are evident in the data from Illinois.  
They are just magnified throughout the entire map of the nation and Illinois 
remains a microcosm of the nation as a whole and the trends which are marking 
our very polarized nation. The 2016 presidential election results in Illinois are a 
template for the very similar national results and the patterns of support for the 
two candidates are indicative of where the two major parties stand currently and 
how they have evolved in the early parts of the 21st Century (Appendix A and B).   
As the data provided here indicate, at the aggregate level there is a deep 
geographical polarization reinforced by ideological, partisan, cultural, racial, 
religious, class, and ethnic divisions which are pervasive at the individual voter 
level and which are unlikely to be erased by one presidential election or the first 
Trump administration.  Indeed, the tenor, content and conduct of this past 
election are likely to have exacerbated the deep polarization of this country and 
are likely to be projected into the foreseeable future.   The Republicans have 
gained a working majority in the House and Senate, control of the White House, 
and the ability to dominate the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary for the 
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next generation.  Whether they can use their newly minted unified government to 
unify the country remains to be seen.   
The Individual Level Data Analysis  
In the section above we examined the aggregate voting returns for the 
United States and for Illinois.  There are many things that aggregate data can revel 
and many advantage to such an analysis.  Geography is of basic importance in 
understanding American politics and aggregate data reveal our geographic 
divisions in graphic detail. It is particularly important in analyzing presidential 
election returns because of the unique institution of the Electoral College and the 
pivotal position it holds in determining who wins the presidency. 
 The geographic subdivisions, states and counties, also reveal the 
remarkable continuity in American politics which show that there is great 
continuity between elections and the changes are usually marginal and 
incremental (Key, 1949; Key, 1966; Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008; Levendusky, 
2009). But aggregate data also have their limitations.  The analyst cannot use 
aggregate data effectively to focus on the individual level characteristics of the 
respondents which can only be indirectly inferred from such data.  It takes survey 
data to provide a more precise micro level look at questions of what kinds of 
people turned out to vote for which candidates (Kramer, 1983).  
 Fortunately, we do have survey data which are relevant to answering such 
questions for Illinois voters.  Since 2008 the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute has 
been conducting statewide polls on government, politics and public policy 
questions in Illinois.  Most of the surveys have relied on a sample of 1,000 
registered voters.   The institute has completed ten such statewide polls and 
published their results (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016).  Taken together these 
polls provide a rich resource of longitudinal data on this important Midwestern 
state. 
 The survey we will rely on here is the one taken statewide from Tuesday, 
September 27 through Sunday, October 2, 2016.  The overall poll included 1,000 
registered voters and had a margin of error of 3.1 percentage points.   
 The timing of the poll was based on our need to start after the first 
presidential debate which was held on September 26th.  This was a debate which 
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drew an unprecedented audience with an estimate that over eighty million 
viewers watched it on television or on a mobile device.  It was widely considered 
to be a victory for Hillary Clinton according to most pundits and the scientific polls 
taken after the debate ended (Saad, October 20-12, 2016).  Our survey entered 
the field the evening after the first debate and took most of that week to 
complete.  It probably caught the upswing toward Clinton which started at that 
point in the campaign when she began to open up a significant lead in the polls, a 
lead which only increased and grew after the second and third debates both of 
which the scientific polls also estimated that she had won.   
 In some respects it would have been better to have a poll taken closer to 
the November 8th election since it is well recognized that people can change their 
minds and some are undecided up until the day they vote.  However, in the case 
of the 2016 presidential election, this is not an insurmountable obstacle to using 
poll data taken a month before the final vote.  For one thing early voting has 
made it possible for millions to cast their ballot well before the official day of the 
election. Early voting in Illinois started on September 29th, the week in which our 
poll was in the field.   
 In addition this is such a polarized era that the vast majority of Americans 
made a relatively early decision and knew who they would vote for, based on 
party identification, ideology and reaction to the candidates’ images.  In our poll 
we found less than ten percent who said they were undecided about their choice 
for president.  So, overall there no disqualifying arguments against using data 
taken from a poll done in late September and early October for the analytical 
purposes pursued in this paper.   
 Our question regarding voting intention is the simple one used by all 
pollsters, i.e. “If the election for president were being held today, would you vote 
for [Trump, Clinton, Johnson, or Stein, with the order of the candidates rotated 
randomly].  The results are provided in Table 3.   
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Table 3 
    Presidential Vote Intentions 
   Trump   27.9% 
   Clinton   52.7 
   Johnson    5.2 
   Stein     1.5 
   Someone  else   3.1 
   Don’t Know    9.7 
N=950  Note: This question was not asked of those who said they would probably 
not vote.   Undecided Leaners were included in the totals for each candidate.  
 These results presaged a fairly handy victory for Hillary Clinton in her native 
state.  52.7% chose Clinton in our poll; 27.9% chose Trump, while Johnson at 5.2% 
and Stein at 1.5% divided the third party vote with 9.5% remaining undecided at 
this point.  It is interesting to note that this order is the same as the final 
statewide aggregate vote count although the totals for each candidate increased 
because of late deciders.  As was indicated earlier, the final results showed that 
Clinton took 55.8%; Trump 38.8% with Johnson at 3.8 % and Stein at 1.4% (Illinois 
State Board of Elections).  Obviously, Trump did better than our poll projected by 
a margin of 10%, and this is undoubtedly because the undecideds voted 
disproportionately for Trump and most of the Republican identifiers who had 
been wavering, ultimately went home and voted for Trump. However, at 38.8% in 
the final tally of the vote Trump only marginally exceeded what might be 
considered the core base of the Republican coalition in Illinois. Clinton by contrast 
achieved 55.8% in the final vote which is only 3% higher than our poll found 
supporting her at approximately one month out. Our Illinois poll provides some 
evidence for the proposition that Clinton did not gain the support of a lot of late 
deciding voters in the last four weeks of the campaign and the late deciders 
disproportionately went to Trump.     
 We turn next to an analysis of the three great geographical divisions of 
Illinois politics, that is, the differences between the City of Chicago, the suburbs 
18 
 
which are composed of Cook County outside the city plus the so called “Collar 
Counties” of DuPage, Lake, Kane, Will, and McHenry counties. The remaining 
ninety six counties are lumped together as “Downstate” (Colby and Green, 1986).  
Table 4 provides these results. 
      Table 4  
  Presidential Vote Intentions by Geographical Division 
    Chicago City  Suburbs Downstate 
 Trump   19%       25%          39% 
 Clinton    66        56           38 
 Johnson     6         5            4 
 Stein      2         1                      2 
 Other/Don’t Know    7        13                     16                           
        
The overall macro geographical analysis of any Illinois election now rests on 
the well documented generalizations that Central City Chicago is a historic 
stronghold for the Democratic Party; much of Downstate is a stronghold for the 
Republican Party, and the balance of power, as well as most population growth in 
Illinois lies in the suburbs (Ibid).  These widely shared expectations about how 
Illinois votes are borne out and reinforced by the results in Table 4.  Nationally it 
is widely recognized that there are “blue states” and “red states”, i.e. those which 
historically vote for the Democrats and the Republicans respectively and which 
can ordinarily be favored to win those states routinely (Bishop, 2008, Gelman, 
2008).  Illinois has been regarded as a dependably blue state since 1992 when Bill 
Clinton bested George H. W. Bush in the Prairie State that year. The last time the 
Republicans won Illinois in a presidential election was when Bush beat Dukakis in 
1988.   
 Inside the states there are also blue counties and regions and red counties 
and regions which are just as dependable for their parties no matter what the 
state-wide results are or what the context of the particular campaign is. Some 
Illinois counties have been voting reliably Republican, or before that Whig, since 
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Abraham Lincoln was running for office.  In Illinois the City of Chicago is deep 
blue, most of the Downstate counties are red, and the suburbs are purple since 
they are more diverse and less dependable for either party.   
 Clearly Clinton ran away with the responses in Chicago with two-thirds of 
the respondents to our poll saying they planned to vote for her.  Downstate was 
very close, but there the usual expectations held with Trump enjoying a slight 
lead of 39% to 38% in our poll.  The swing counties of the suburbs, however, show 
where elections are won in Illinois.  There Clinton was projected to do very well 
sporting a 56.5% to 25.5% lead over Trump at that point in the fall campaign. 
 Comparisons with the final vote tally provided by the Illinois State Board of 
Elections show that our projections were not far wide of the final mark.  There is a 
widely shared expectation in Illinois politics that a Republican will get beaten in 
the City of Chicago, and the Democratic candidate will get beaten Downstate.  
The relevant questions are ordinarily about turnout and about how much each 
party will win or lose in those two predictable areas.  The payoff answer, 
however, is in suburban Chicago.  There we see from these results that Donald 
Trump at the time of our poll was doing very poorly for a Republican candidate.  
He lost those Collar Counties and suburban Cook County by a wide margin in our 
poll and as it turned out he lost Cook and four of the five Collar Counties in the 
final vote. 
It is also true that this level of loss in urban and suburban America is the 
key to the size and the contours of Trump’s deficits (and strengths) nation-wide 
which resulted in Clinton winning the popular vote by almost three million votes.  
It is important to note also that Clinton’s loss in the rural, small town and small 
city areas, both in Illinois and nationally, was decisive and this led to her loss of 
the Electoral College and the presidency.   
We are a nation deeply divided by where we live and the economic 
situation, personal identification and life style implications of those residence 
choices.  Geography may not necessarily be absolute destiny in American politics, 
but it is a very important part of the explanation for how the American voter sees 
the world and behaves politically and why our political results are so divided at 
the aggregate level (Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008).   
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 Moving past geography as an explanation for voting behavior, there are 
some other well-known and widely recognized explanatory variables that have 
been used consistently for almost seventy years in explaining why Americans vote 
as they do (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Campbell, et al., 1966). These 
are the variables that uniquely depend on survey data to analyze at the individual 
level.    
The most important of these are party identification and ideology.  These 
are the two most important psychological or attitudinal variables identified in the 
long line of historic studies that have accumulated over seven decades in the 
extensive voting behavior literature which is the best mined empirical subfield in 
all of Political Science (Ibid).  Those two variables for Illinois voters are covered in 
Tables 5 and 6 below.   
     Table 5 
  Presidential Vote Intentions by Party Identification 
   Democrat  Independent Republican 
 Trump         3%                     34%         69% 
 Clinton         86           36                          9 
 Johnson           3             8                              6                    
 Stein            1             3           2 
 Other/D/K           8            19         14 
 
Table 6 
  Presidential Vote Intentions by Political Ideology 
   Liberal Moderate Conservative 
 Trump     5%         17%         61% 
 Clinton    85                       55                   17 
 Johnson             3           9                     4 
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 Stein       2                         1                     1 
 Other/D/K         5                       17                   16 
 It is evident from these two tables that the traditional voting behavior 
explanations were very important in the Trump versus Clinton contest no matter 
how unorthodox and unconventional their campaigns were.  As expected party 
identification and ideology are quite systematically related to the voting 
intentions of the Illinois respondents in this poll.  As Table 5 shows, fully 86% of 
the Democratic respondents reported that they intended to vote for Clinton, 
while 36% of the Independents and 9% of the Republicans said they would vote 
for Clinton. 
 This is in comparison with 69% of the Republicans who said they planned to 
vote for Trump, with 34% of the Independents and 3% of the Democrats who 
reported the same plans.  36% of the Independents in our poll said they planned 
to vote for Clinton.  These results clearly indicate some of the distance Trump 
made up nationally in the last four weeks as the exit polls show that Trump 
ultimately took 90% of the Republican vote and 48% of the Independent vote 
while Clinton took 89% of the Democratic vote nationally and 42% of the 
Independents (AEI and Pew Exit polls, November 9, 2016).  
The other most important attitudinal variable is self-identified ideology.  
We have long recognized that the nation is deeply divided on ideological grounds.  
When this polarization first became evident, the conservatives had an almost two 
to one advantage with approximately 40% saying they were conservatives, 20% 
liberals, and the remainder in between as moderates.  More recently, the percent 
identifying as liberal has grown marginally and the conservatives have shrunk a bit 
(Newport, 2016).  That pattern has been even more true in Illinois where over the 
long term, liberals have increased from 27% in 2010 to 33% in 2016 while 
conservatives have dropped from 40% to 33% with the moderates only moving 
from 27% to 28% during the same period (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, June, 
2016, 40-41). 
 Self-identified ideology provided an advantage to Clinton in our data from 
Illinois voters.  From Table 6 we can see that 85% of liberals said they would vote 
for Clinton with 55% of the moderates and 17% of the conservatives saying they 
would also vote for her.  On the Trump side, only 61% of conservatives said they 
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would vote for him while 17% said they would vote for Clinton.  Moderates broke 
in Clinton’s favor by 55% to 17%.  This result from Illinois indicates something 
about the problems Trump encountered early and up until the later stages of his 
campaign when Republican identifiers and conservatives essentially went home 
and voted for Trump nationally by 81% to 15% for Clinton (AEI and Pew Exit polls, 
November 10, 2016).   
The next set of important explanations for the vote are the fundamental 
demographic variables which we have covered in Tables 7- 12 below.  The results 
fit some recognized patterns from the voting behavior research generally with 
some interesting twists and variations associated with this particular campaign.   
     Table 7  
   Presidential Vote Intention by Gender 
     Male  Female 
 Trump    34%    22% 
 Clinton    46     59 
 Johnson      7       4 
 Stein       1       2 
 Other/D/K     12     14 
  
We will examine gender first.  Since 1980 and the Reagan vs. Carter race, 
gender has played an important part in explaining large groups of people who 
vote differently. Before 1980 women voters gave a modest edge to Republican 
presidential candidates compared to men.   The 1980 election produced the first 
instance of the “gender gap” which saw men voting disproportionately for the 
Republican candidate and women voting disproportionately for the Democratic 
candidate (Flanagan and Zingale, 2008, Chapter 5; Conway, Steuernagel and 
Ahern, 2005, Chapter 5).  In that race women voted for the Democrats by a 12% 
margin while men voted for the Republicans by a 4% margin (Jennings and Niemi, 
2000, 119).  Since 1980 the gender gap has ranged up and down from four to 
twelve percent, but it has constantly appeared. 
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 The candidates of the 2016 campaign produced a firm expectation that the 
gender gap would continue and probably grow.  Hillary Clinton was the first 
woman to ever run at the top of the ticket for a major party.  That alone would 
have provoked ample expectations for a gender gap.  Then Trump made a 
number of comments deemed to be disrespectful and dismissive of women. Early 
in the campaign, he publicly attacked a number of high profile women, like Carly 
Fiorina and Megyn Kelly.  Later he was overheard making misogynistic comments 
in a tape recording taken from an “Access Hollywood” bus trip which was leaked 
to the press.  That revelation then stimulated accusations from a dozen women 
who came forward and accused Trump of unprovoked and unwanted sexual 
attacks on them.  This controversy continued up until election day and beyond.   
 Table 7 provides the results in the first column for the gender differences 
among Illinois voters.  As expected, the gender gap was very much in evidence in 
our poll. Trump was supported by 34% of the male voters and only 22% of female 
voters.  This constitutes a 12% difference for male vs. female Trump voters.  
Clinton was supported by 46% of male voters and 59% of female voters, for a 13% 
difference.    
Thus, our expectations of a sizeable gender gap were borne out.  
Nationally, the final exit polls indicated that there was a gender gap of 12% across 
the entire voting population (Pew and AEI exit polls). This is almost identical to 
the gender gap we found in Illinois one month before the election.  Thus, for the 
long term the Republicans have a problem appealing to women voters and 
Democrats, likewise, have a problem appealing to male voters. That is true both 
nationally and in Illinois and the gap continued in 2016.   
 This will undoubtedly be an issue that the Democratic National Committee 
and Democratic leaders in general will debate and puzzle over as they try to 
construct a narrative about the future of their party in the wake of their stinging 
and unexpected loss of the presidential election.  Since the Republicans won so 
handily and now control all three branches of the government they are not likely 
to worry a great deal in the immediate future about appealing more to women 
voters.   
Next, age is ordinarily an important independent variable offering some 
explanation for the vote.  From the early days of the voting behavior research the 
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expectation has been that young people are more likely to vote for the Democrats 
and the older people are more likely to vote for the Republicans.  This 
generalization goes back to the roots of the whole voting behavior research 
enterprise (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, 
and Stokes, 1966).  Later research showed that this relationship depended on the 
generational experiences of the age cohorts. For example, if the oldest cohort 
came of age during the Great Depression, they were more likely to be Democrats 
and to retain that identification over time (Flanagan and Zingale, 2008, 92-95).   
    Table 8 
  Presidential Vote Intentions by Age 
  <35  35-50  51-65  66+ 
Trump 15%    22%    30%    37% 
Clinton 57    58     49     53 
Johnson 13      6       4       2 
Stein    4       2       1       0 
Other/D/K    11      12                  16        8 
  
Our poll results in Table 8 indicate that age did not really discriminate much 
for Clinton’s planned voters in Illinois.   Fifty-seven percent of the under 35 voters 
said they planned to vote for Clinton; 58% of the middle aged voters indicated 
Clinton; 49% of the fifty-one to sixty-five age group and 53% of the senior citizens 
said they would vote for Clinton. This indicates a small four percent advantage for 
Clinton among the youngest cohort of voters when compared to the oldest 
Clinton voters.     
This compares to only 15% of the youngest category under 35 who planned 
to vote for Trump; 22% of the 35 to 50 group; 30% of the 51 to 65 group; and 37% 
of those 65 and above who said they planned to vote for Trump.  So, it is evident 
that the relationship between age and intention to vote for Trump is a linear one 
and that the older the respondent was the more likely they were to plan to vote 
for Trump in this poll.  But, the paltry 15% of the youngest voter category, those 
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35 and younger, indicated just how much of a problem the youngest age cohort 
was for the Trump campaign early on.   
Certainly this was true in Illinois and it also appears to be true from all the 
exit polls for the nation as a whole. Those exit polls showed that the youngest 
cohort, 18 to 29 year olds voted 55% to 37% for Clinton over Trump while the 
oldest cohort, 65 and up voted for Trump by 53% to 45% (Pew and AEI exit polls).  
The problem for the Clinton camp, however, was turnout among the young.  They 
were counting on a heavy turnout from the youngest age cohort, and while 
Clinton did very well among young voters, their turnout did not quite live up to 
the early expectations and that loss may have been just enough for the margin of 
victory to go to Trump instead of Clinton (Pew poll, November 10, 2016). 
The other highly important demographic variable for explaining the vote 
generically is race.  It has long been recognized that white voters are much more 
likely to choose a Republican ballot while minority voters, especially African-
American and Hispanic voters are more likely to vote for the Democrats.  This 
racial divide is long standing and has become one of the most important fault 
lines in American politics. It is mostly the result of the almost complete                 
re-alignment of the white south out of the Democratic Party and into the 
Republican Party while the black South went the opposite direction in the wake of 
the Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960s (Key, 1949; Black and Black, 1987, 1992).  
Today the white South is the most important and most dependable component of 
the Republican Party coalition and one which gives it a major advantage in 
congressional elections and a solid base for the presidential elections.   
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    Table 9 
  Presidential Vote Intentions by Race 
  White  Black  Hispanic Other 
Trump   35%     2%      12%     20% 
Clinton    45    82      78      62 
Johnson      6      3                       0                    7 
Stein       1                    1                      2                    0 
Other/D/K    13     12                     7      11 
 
Table 9 indicates that this fault line certainly continued to hold true in 
Illinois when it comes to the minority voters but the picture with white voters is 
more complicated.  Eighty-two percent of Illinois black voters indicated that they 
intended to vote for Clinton while 78% of Hispanic voters indicated the same.  The 
final exit polls showed that these racial disparities only grew in the final vote. The 
national exit polls indicate that Clinton received 88% of the African-American vote 
compared to 8% for Trump and 65% of the Hispanic vote for Clinton to 29% for 
Trump (AEI and Pew Polls).  Clinton’s final tally compares somewhat unfavorably 
with the 92% of black voters, and 71% of Hispanics who voted for Obama in 2012. 
(Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116).  Thus, Clinton won handily among both of the 
nation’s largest minority groups, but their preference for her fell somewhat below 
the levels achieved by Obama in both 2008 and 2012 and indicates how she could 
come close but still lose the presidency. 
More importantly electorally are the 70% of the voters who are white.  Our 
Illinois poll showed 45% of white voters planned to vote for Clinton while only 
35% said they would vote for Trump.  The final results indicate that white voters 
nationwide ultimately decided to vote disproportionately for Trump over Clinton. 
Although like our Illinois respondents white voters nation-wide may have 
harbored initial reluctance to vote for Trump, but in the final analysis they were 
the keys to his national victory.   
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The final national exit polls showed that Clinton encountered major 
problems with white voters which proved to be impossible to overcome.  Trump 
won the white vote by a 21% margin, 58% to 37%.  This is in contrast to the 59% 
of white voters who went for Romney in 2012 and 55% who went for McCain in 
2008 (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116).  Trump won among white voters without 
college degrees by 67% to 28%. This was the largest gap since the exit polls were 
initiated in 1980 (Tyson, 2016, Pew exit polls).   Trump won white voters with a 
college degree by 49% to 45%. Since there are more white voters without college 
degrees than any other demographic group in the nation, Trump’s strength with 
this group was the most essential fact in the electoral win for him.   
The “Autopsy” of the 2012 campaign done by the Republican National 
Committee studied how to increase their appeal to the young, minorities and 
women among other demographic groups (Republican National Committee, 
March 18, 2013).  Many critics pointed out that the Republican base was heavily 
weighted toward white people and the oldest voters and no party can stake their 
future on the cohort which is declining most rapidly.  This problem will 
undoubtedly cease to be very compelling for Republicans as they contemplate 
their future as the masters of a whole new universe ushered in by their victories 
in congress and the presidency on November 8th.   
It will, however, become a bone of contention for the Democrats as they 
begin the inevitable task of trying to understand what went wrong with their 
presidential and congressional hopes and expectations.  There will undoubtedly 
be recriminations and debates regarding what to do about the Democrats’ losses 
and how to broaden the appeal of the party at the national, state and local levels.  
The debate started within one week of the election results being counted when 
some on the left who had supported Bernie Sanders voiced the opinion that 
Sanders would have won the presidency, a view Sanders himself seemed to 
consider likely (Stiglitz, November 18, 2016).  They were opposed by other party 
elements who contended that the Democrats had moved too far to the left and 
that their long term salvation depended on a tack back toward the middle.  Those 
familiar factions within the Democratic Party had been muted during eight years 
of the Obama Administration; however, they broke out in full force when Clinton 
lost the presidency and the Democrats failed to take back the Senate.  That 
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debate is only beginning as this paper is being written, but it will not go away any 
time soon.  It is the inevitable and unenviable fate of the losing party.   
Another variable where there was expected to be a wide disparity between 
Clinton supporters and Trump supporters was religious identification.  For several 
cycles now those who identify with the more fundamentalist churches and those 
who attend church services the most regularly have been avidly supporting the 
Republican Party (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116).  This is a trend that is especially 
important in the South; however, it is an important national trend as well.  On the 
other side of the coin, those who identify with more mainline Protestant 
denominations, Jewish people, and those who are secular and claim no religious 
affiliation have increasingly voted for Democratic presidential candidates.  
Accordingly, scholars have discovered a “religious gap” which has taken on more 
and more importance in a deeply polarized America. 
Table 10 reports on our question asking the voters whether they consider 
themselves to be an evangelical or born again Christian.  Table 11 provides the 
results on the question of how often they attend church services. 
     Table 10 
  Vote Intentions by Evangelical Christian Identification 
  Born Again? Yes   No  Non Christian 
Trump  42%    31%            12% 
Clinton  38    48   72 
Johnson    3      6     4 
Stein     1      1     2 
Other/D/K  17    13     2 
 
It is evident from this table that there was indeed a religion gap in the 2016 
Illinois presidential election. 42% of the evangelical or born again Christians said 
they would vote for Trump while only 31% of those who did not claim this 
religious identification said they would vote for Trump.  On the other side, 38% of 
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the evangelical or born again Christians said they would vote for Clinton while 
48% of those who did not claim this identification were Clinton voters. 
The final results for the nation as a whole showed just how dramatically the 
evangelical church people finally settled on Trump over Clinton.  The exit polls 
showed that evangelical church goers made up 26%, or slightly over one quarter 
of the total voting population.  They voted for Trump over Clinton by a resounding 
83% to 16% (Tyson, 2016; Bowman, 2016, Pew and AEI polls).  Whatever early 
trepidation evangelicals may have felt about Trump’s private life and public 
conduct, they swallowed those misgivings and trooped to the polls for Trump at 
rates higher than they had supported Mitt Romney over Obama in 2012.   
Another closely related category is those who attend church most 
frequently.  Studies have consistently shown that those who attend church 
weekly or even more often are much more likely to vote for the Republicans.  Our 
results in Table 11 show that this was not the case for the presidential vote in 
Illinois in 2016 projected at the time our poll was taken.  The division between the 
most devout, those who attend weekly was close but shades in Clinton’s favor by 
4%.  Those who said they attended almost every week or once or twice a month 
and a few times a year were for Clinton by an even more lopsided margins.  
Among the most secular, i.e. the never attend, there was a 39% gap, which was in 
keeping with the final national results according to the exit polls.      
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Table 11 
 Vote Intentions by Frequency of Church Attendance 
Every  Almost Once or A few  Never  Refused                                   
Week    Every   twice a times a                                                                                                
             week     month           year                                                 
Trump    40%   20%     27%      26%     20%     30% 
Clinton    44     54      55       55       59       45 
Johnson    3       9       3        5           7                     5 
Stein        1       1       1         1                     2                     5 
Other/      12       16                  14            13                   11                  15                                      
D/K 
A global economy and multi-national trade deals have pluses and minuses 
in terms of how many jobs they create and destroy and it is now widely 
understood that they create winners and losers.   Those who lost their jobs 
because of trade imbalances or jobs moving off shore were also those most often 
identified as the angry and disaffected people most attracted to Trump.   
There is growing understanding that those without much education and 
without the skills that are important to gaining and holding a job in the modern 
economy, where the competitive worker may be half a world away, fall 
disproportionately on the less educated.  These voters are often also 
disproportionately congregated geographically in the old American “Rust Belt” of 
the upper Midwest and in the rural parts of the South and the Great Plains states.  
Thus, there is also a geographic overlay to the educational base dynamic.   
Our data taken from Illinois, a state which has also experienced significant 
economic hardship among some industries and in some geographic areas, 
especially the rural and small cities of Illinois, indicate some support for this 
hypothesis about the uneven impact of trade and the global economy on the 
voters. 
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    Table 12 
Presidential Vote Intentions by Education 
  H. S. or Less  Some College College + 
Trump        29%           30%      26% 
Clinton                  54                               50                 55 
Johnson           4                                 5                            5 
Stein            1             1                            2 
Other/D/K             11            14        12 
         
Table 12 shows that those with high school or less education and some 
college were somewhat more likely to be Trump supporters (29% and 30% 
respectively) while only 26% of those with college degrees said they would 
support Trump in our Illinois poll.   
The Clinton side is murkier in our poll since 54% of those with only a high 
school education and 55% of those with a college degree said they planned to 
vote for Clinton. The “some college” category was actually the lowest with 50% of 
them who claimed plans to support Clinton.  They, too, are probably among the 
voters who have disproportionately suffered from the economic disruptions of a 
global market and reduced job supplies, but the differences between this group 
and the lowest and highest educational group are not large in our study.   This is 
the place where our Illinois poll, taken about one month before the election, 
varied the most markedly from the final results as reflected in the exit polls.  This 
may be partially attributable to there being more undecided voters among those 
with less education and those who decided late went disproportionately for 
Trump.  It is also possible, also, of course, that Illinois was simply not a bellwether 
of the final national results when it comes to the impact of education and Illinois 
did go for Clinton more heavily than the national popular vote did although the 
difference was not large.   
The exit polls showed that those voters without a college degree voted for 
Trump by a 52% to 44% margin.  College graduates voted for Clinton by a 52% to 
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43% margin (Tyson, Pew exit poll, 2016).  However, if the analysis is restricted to 
just white voters the picture changes.  There the exit polls found that 67% of 
whites without college degrees supported Trump compared to 28% for Clinton- a 
39 point advantage to Trump. This is the largest this educational gap has been 
going back to 1980 (Ibid).   
White college graduates voted for Trump over Clinton by a 49% to 45% 
margin.  The white respondents had to have an advanced graduate or 
professional degree before you find more than a majority for Clinton over Trump. 
This constituted a massive educational gap which favored Trump when you 
consider how many voters have not graduated college (72%) versus those who 
have attained at least a bachelor’s degree or a graduate or professional degree 
(28%) (Galston and Hedrickson, November 18, 2016).  This is a problem of some 
serious magnitude for the Democrats who used to win the less educated vote by a 
wide margin.  At least for this election, the less educated were the Trump base, 
and they are much more numerous than those with advanced education.  Perhaps 
this is why he famously exclaimed in one of his rallies near the end, “I love the less 
educated.”   
Looking Toward the Future: What Does It All Mean? 
Donald Trump’s victory in winning the presidency was as unexpected as his 
campaign was unconventional.  The last polls before the election had consistently 
shown that it would be a close race, but almost all of the national polls showed 
Clinton with a small lead, well within the margin of error for most.  Indeed, at the 
point when the late polls were taken, the Real Clear Politics averages had shown 
Clinton with a modest lead that she had maintained for approximately ninety days 
of the general election contest.   
While searching for answers analysts and pundits turned toward the 
explanation that the late deciders had apparently gone disproportionately for 
Trump.  In addition, Republican Party identifiers almost all went back to their 
partisan home finally since the exit polls showed that 90% of them voted for the 
party’s nominee.  Independents split, but voted somewhat more heavily for 
Trump than had been expected.   
Turnout is always important and turnout was down to 55.6 % which is not 
bad but falls significantly below the 61.6 attained in Obama’s first election in 2008 
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and somewhat below the 58.2 % achieved in Obama’s second election in 2012 
(Stanley and Niemi, 2015, 5).  Just as importantly, the Democratic constituencies 
that Clinton relied on so heavily, especially African-American and Hispanic voters 
and the young did vote for her markedly as expected; however, their margins did 
not quite reach the levels enjoyed by Obama in 2008 or even in 2012.  Also, their 
turnout rates declined just a bit, but enough to make the crucial difference. 
It is also worth noting that Clinton won the popular vote, as the polls had 
accurately predicted by nearly three million votes or a 2 percent margin.   In spite 
of this achievement, she also lost the Electoral College vote by a vote of 304 to 
227 (Calfas, December 20, 2016).  Trump became the fifth American president 
selected by the Electoral College even though he lost the popular vote by a 
significant margin.  The election of 2016 also became the second time in the 21st 
Century to see the popular vote winner denied the presidency, with the 
contentious 2000 election being the first instance.  This constitutes two out of five 
(40%) presidential elections held in this century and may presage a new trend in 
this deeply polarized era in American politics.   
The major reason Clinton lost the Electoral College vote was that she lost 
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, three states that Democrats had routinely 
won and that she counted on as her “blue wall” of electoral protection against 
just such a result. She lost those three by a combined total of approximately 
100,000 votes.  Those were all big industrial states, commonly referred to now as 
the “Rust Belt” where the globalization of the economy had hurt jobs and 
manufacturing, and they are all states with a major agricultural sector to their 
economy.  They are also states with large cities and metropolitan areas where the 
major centers of economic and political power in this country are located and 
where there is a serious rural versus urban political and cultural divide.    
Those big traditionally Democratic states have a lot in common with Illinois 
which has experienced many of the same economic stresses and where 
manufacturing jobs losses have been significant as the nation and the world 
turned increasingly toward the service and high tech economy and away from the 
basic manufacturing sector where productivity increases, as well as international 
trade, had eliminated millions of jobs.   
34 
 
The biggest difference, of course, is that Clinton won her native state while 
also losing the presidency.  The contours of that victory, however, are very 
instructive for what Clinton’s and Trump’s performances in Illinois can teach us 
about the future of both major parties, and especially about the challenge which 
now faces the Democratic Party.  Like all parties which lose the presidential 
contest, the Democrats now face a period of uncertainty, internal conflict and 
soul-searching as they try to chart their future and plan and hope for a come-
back. The Republicans faced the same problem in 2013 when they lost for the 
second time to Obama.  
The blueprint of their comeback was led by Reince Priebus, the Chair of the 
Republican National Committee, now the Chief of Staff in the Trump White 
House, which commissioned a thorough study of the Republicans’ electoral 
problems and laid out plans for recapturing the White House and keeping the 
congress (Republican National Committee, 2013).  In due time the Democrats will 
undoubtedly come forward with a similar document led by the new Chair of the 
Democratic National Committee as they try to decide who will speak for the party 
and what course they should take. The challenge for the Democrats is magnified 
by the fact that they now face a Republican Party in complete control of the two 
political branches and a period of unified government under the Republicans’ 
control will tax the ability of the Democrats to develop a come-back strategy.   
For the Democrats, just understanding and analyzing carefully where they 
won and lost, both in a geographic and in the individual and group identity levels 
of analysis is crucial to getting started on finding a cure.  In this quest it would be 
useful to start with geography because this was truly a deeply divided election 
geographically where the contours of the outcome were etched in the political 
boundaries of the states and the counties.  This was evident in the national results 
which showed a deep division between the predominantly urban and the rural 
states and the urban and rural areas within the states with the suburbs acting as 
something of a bridge and balance of power between the two.  
 In addition, there were the usual deep regional differences between the 
northeast and the west coast with a smattering of other western states such as 
Nevada, New Mexico and Colorado going blue, and Illinois and Minnesota in 
between as Democratic bastions in the Midwest.  The rest of the nation was red.  
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The Democrats will need to figure out why they suffered such an unexpected 
defeat so soon after Barack Obama’s lopsided victory in 2008 followed by his 
somewhat closer, but nevertheless comfortable majority vote victory in 2012. If 
one examines the aggregate results from Obama’s almost landslide victory of 
2008, to a convincing but more narrow victory in 2012, to Clinton’s loss in 2016 
there is a clear downward  progression which threatens to make the Democrats a 
distinctly minority party for a political generation.   
If one examines carefully the national electoral picture from a county level 
of analysis, it is clear that the urban rural divide was starkly salient as Appendix A 
shows graphically.  The national electoral map looks like a sea of red broken 
intermittently by areas of blue almost all of which are the locations of major cities 
and metropolitan areas.  The small blue exceptions in the south are where the 
black vote is strong in some rural counties which is also the case in the southwest 
except that the minorities there tend to be Hispanic.  Thus, geographic, racial and 
ethnic divisions marked our electoral results in 2016 even more decisively than in 
other recent elections.  With the election of Trump over Clinton those divisions 
became even more evident and appeared to be even more hardened by the 
maturing of the era of polarization which has marked American politics for more 
than a generation now. 
Appendix B for the Illinois results shows graphically just how deep the 
divisions between the rural versus urban areas were, again with the suburbs 
providing the balance which in Illinois tilted toward Clinton.  Clinton only carried 
12 counties and those counties were mostly the big counties and/or the locations 
of mid-sized cities where the major state universities are located.   
The trends which worked against Clinton and for Trump nationally have 
been underway for a long time and have worked to the advantage of the 
Republicans although in Illinois the big counties continued to provide a 
Democratic margin that kept the state blue in 2016.   
In an earlier and related Simon Review paper I examined the counties 
carried by Obama in 2012 and 2008.  Appendix C provides those results (See 
Jackson, 2013).  There were 23 of these counties compared to 79 for Mitt 
Romney.  The counties Obama carried were four of the collar counties plus 
DeKalb in northeastern Illinois, a long line of northern and western Illinois 
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counties plus Champaign, the only county he carried in central Illinois, St. Clair in 
the Metro-east area, and Jackson and Alexander counties in southern Illinois.  
Here again we find Obama’s success in Illinois in 2012 depended on the big urban 
counties, the places with a major state university, and a smattering of agricultural 
and small city based counties in northwestern Illinois. 
  Romney won all the predominantly rural and agricultural based counties.  
If geography were the only consideration, the amount of red on the Appendix C 
map shows just how broad Romney’s support was and how much of the state it 
covered.  While this result is not enough to win the presidency, or even a 
statewide office, it does give some important clues as to where the Republican 
Party has traditionally been the strongest in Illinois and where they routinely 
dominate county level offices, state legislative seats, and congressional districts 
which are so red that no Democrat has a realistic chance of winning and the 
incumbent often does not draw a serious challenger.   
This safe red and safe blue districts pattern in the rural versus urban areas 
of Illinois is also endemic to the nation as a whole and is a key to understanding 
how the Republicans have dominated the U. S. House since 2010 and why the 
Democrats did so badly in the 2010, 2014, and 2016 congressional races.  If the 
Democrats do not improve their results in the 2018 mid-term elections, they face 
a bleak future after the 2020 census leads to another reapportionment round 
whose impact will last until 2030.   
From a party building perspective it is important to understand where the 
changes are taking place.  This understanding is particularly important now for the 
Democrats since it is they who will have to drill down deeply in these results for 
every state and try to learn where they have failed and how they can correct their 
problems for the future.  Their potential for ever returning to national power 
quite literally depends on understanding these trends and starting to develop a 
long term strategy that must clearly take geography and demographics into 
account. The need for Republicans to do the same strategic analysis is not nearly 
so immediate or compelling since they won control over all the branches of the 
federal government in the 2016 elections and controlled 31 of the state 
governorships and controlled the state legislative bodies by 68 to 31 chambers or 
a better than two to one margin.   
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Appendices D and E highlight the tides of change which worked against 
Clinton in the 2016 results even though she won the state handily in the popular 
vote.  In effect, this is also a template for her national results where she won the 
popular vote by 2.8 million votes while losing the Electoral College.  On the theme 
of change, it is worth noting that Trump did not lose a single county in Illinois that 
Romney had carried in 2012. Likewise, Clinton did not carry a county in 2016 that 
Obama had lost in 2012. In Illinois, as nationally, the best predictor of how a 
county will likely vote is to look at their prior voting history.  In a polarized era 
that correlation is very high.   
From Appendices D and E we can see where Clinton’s losses, compared to 
Obama’s victories in 2012 and 2008 lay, and these appendices also show that 
some of the earlier losses belonged to Obama as his number of counties won was 
effectively cut in half between 2008 and 2012 (from 46 to 23).  Those losses 
accelerated for Clinton in 2016. The counties that flipped between 2008 and 2012 
and then between 2012 and 2016 all moved in a pro Republican direction.  The 
2016 story is a familiar one by now. Clinton’s losses were centered in northern 
and northwestern and western Illinois with the addition of Alexander, a small 
rural and agricultural county with a high percentage minority population in deep 
southern Illinois.  
The land area in northwestern Illinois included in the map of Clinton’s 
losses, is represented in the U. S. House by a Democrat, Congresswoman Cheri 
Bustos from the 17th District.  She is based in East Moline/ Rock Island and is the 
only remaining Democratic member of the U. S. House from Illinois outside the 
city and its immediate suburbs.  This group of outstate Democrats used to include 
members from the metro-east area, members from central Illinois and deep 
southern Illinois holding seats continuously going all the way back to World War 
II.  The Democratic Party’s Downstate delegation is now reduced to the single seat 
Bustos holds in the 17th District.  Again, this is an indicator for what has happened 
to House Democrats throughout the country as rural and small town and small 
city representative districts have been taken over by the Republicans. This also 
means nationally that the former “Blue Dog Democrats” who constituted a 
moderate coalition have now almost totally been replaced by Republicans, usually 
very conservative Republicans. The remaining Democrats tend to be from the 
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cities and to be more liberal than the moderate Blue Dogs were.  This is a part of 
the realignment which has so polarized American politics in this century.   
Appendix E provides a further elaboration on the theme of partisan 
realignment.  Highlighted here are the counties in transition, in this case from 
voting Democratic in 2012 (and in 2008) but switching to the Republican side in 
2016.  As we saw earlier from the maps provided in the appendices, this is a story 
of those places where Obama won his overwhelming Illinois victory in 2008 and 
his somewhat scaled down victory in 2012.  These are counties where swing 
voters live and counties which also may be in transition from leans Democratic to 
leans Republican 
Some are recent realignments, such as in southern Illinois, where formerly 
deep dyed blue counties, depending on a mixture of social conservatives who 
were also progressive on economic issues and union issues have changed over to 
the Republican Party.  These counties, not coincidentally, are the places where 
manufacturing and mining jobs have dried up or been seriously reduced in 
number.  They are also places where the labor unions, especially the United Mine 
Workers, the Laborers, and the Steel Workers have been reduced in numbers and 
in political strength.  When the labor unions lost numbers and power, the 
Democratic Party lost crucial numbers of voters and power in the halls of 
Congress and reduced control of the Illinois state legislative seats.  Thus, the saga 
of what happened to Clinton in 2016, and what has been happening to Downstate 
Democrats in Illinois continued to unfold and accelerate in 2016. 
 In an attempt to understand geographic and demographic continuity and 
change more thoroughly, Appendices F through I provide a listing and graphic 
representation of those consistently blue and red counties.  They also provide a 
more in depth analysis of some of the most important demographic variables 
which I hypothesized would distinguish these counties with quite polar political 
histories. 
Appendix F provides an overview of where the most loyal Democratic 
counties are in Illinois.  These are the counties that were won by the Democrats 
consistently between 2000 and 2016.  This period includes the candidacies of Al 
Gore, John Kerry, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton spanning five presidential 
elections and sixteen years.  Through all the changes in the international, 
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national, state and local context, and taking into consideration all of the 
differences between these four candidates and their opponents, these six 
counties stayed firmly in the Democratic column and provided the loyal base for 
the Democrats for the first five elections of the 21st Century. 
The geographic locations of these counties range from Cook County, the 
mega-county in northeastern Illinois, Rock Island in western Illinois, Peoria and 
Champaign in central Illinois, St. Clair in the Metro-East southwestern location 
adjacent to St. Louis, and Jackson County in southern Illinois. Chicago is, of course, 
the major population and economic center of the entire state and is dominant in 
economic terms and which also has a lot of political power because of its size and 
diversity.   
Outside Chicago, the most loyal Democratic counties are all medium sized 
or large counties except for Jackson which has a long history of supporting 
Democrats and is the home of Southern Illinois University Carbondale.  
Champaign is a medium sized county in central Illinois and the home to the 
University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, the state’s flagship and largest university.  
Peoria is the home of Caterpillar and Bradley University and is a bastion of some 
strength for organized labor.  Rock Island, on the Iowa border and a part of the 
“Quad Cities” metropolitan complex, is also known for its manufacturing history 
and for the strength of its labor movement.  All of these counties display the kinds 
of demographic and economic diversity one would expect to be the geographic 
hallmarks of the Democratic base.   
Appendix G graphically highlights those most loyal Republican counties in 
Illinois.  These are the counties where the Republican candidate for president has 
won every election between 2000 and 2016. The first thing one notices is that the 
list of super loyal counties is much longer for the Republicans than it is for the 
Democrats.  There are 56 such Republican counties and only 6 of the Democratic 
strongholds.  Of course, the large population of the loyal Democratic counties 
helps to make up for the much more numerous loyal Republican counties.  
Nevertheless, as the nation learned in both 2000 and 2016, geography and 
control of more states and congressional districts does make a difference in 
gaining control of political power, especially in the White House and the U.S. 
House of Representative both of which reward a strategic and efficient 
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geographic distribution of party strength over the popular vote.  In 2016 the 
American public once again learned the basic civics lesson that the Electoral 
College can negate the popular vote in the selection of the U. S. president.   
 Keep in mind that this consistent Republican support included the two 
Barack Obama presidential victories in 2008 and 2012 when he won 
overwhelming popular and Electoral College victories nationally and statewide in 
2008 and strong, but not as dominate victories both nationally and statewide in 
2012.  Central, western and most parts of southern Illinois have been bastions of 
dependable Republican strength in the 21st century although this strength is of 
recent vintage in southern Illinois.  Some of this dominance has been in place 
literally since Lincoln ran for the first time in 1860 for the newly formed 
Republican Party and many of those counties have been the backbone of the 
Republican Party in Illinois ever since.  
 Table 13 was assembled to provide a more in depth and comparative 
demographic description of the most loyal Republican and the most loyal 
Democratic counties over the period since the 2000 elections. A deeper 
perspective is provided by delving into the demographics of these deep red and 
deep blue Illinois counties.  Appendices H and I provide the more in depth county 
by county democratic description of these same counties.  
 
 
This analysis reveals that the counties which voted for Trump were much 
smaller and mostly more rural, and of course much more numerous than those 
which voted for Clinton. This has been the pattern for all of the election cycles in 
Illinois since the 2000 election as these appendices show that those counties 
which have been the consistent base of support for the Republican Party are 
much more homogeneous racially at 95.5% white compared to 2.9% black and 
2.1% Hispanic. By comparison the Democratic base counties are 74.5% white, 
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18.l4% black and 8.9% Hispanic.  So, racial diversity versus homogeneity is the 
most obvious and most notable description of the traditionally red versus 
traditionally blue counties in Illinois.   
As Table 13 indicates, there were some income disparities evident as well.  
The most notable is that the median per capita income is almost $3,000 higher in 
the blue counties compared to the red counties. On the other hand, median 
household income was essentially the same in the two types of counties and the 
percent below the poverty line was somewhat higher in the blue counties.  This 
finding illustrates the fact that the Democratic counties are very diverse and often 
there is a large gap between the well off and the poor in these counties.  The fact 
is that both red and blue counties have the problems and challenges of significant 
poverty and income inequality, and they have persistent demands for social 
safety net types of governmental protections for the have nots.   
Appendix J is also a complement to Table 13.  It provides the demographic 
characteristics of the swing or battleground counties.  These are the ones which 
Obama carried in 2012 (and in 2008) but which Clinton lost in 2016.  These 
counties could be either the harbingers of a more permanent partisan 
realignment in favor of the Republican Party, or the home of more voters who are 
more independent and more open to persuasion by either party.  They stuck with 
Obama when his national and state popularity had declined in 2012 as compared 
to 2008, but they were not willing to choose Clinton over Trump in 2016.   
Appropriately, these swing counties fit between the most loyal Democratic 
counties and the most loyal Republican counties on the demographics.  That is 
they are much smaller in population than the loyal blue counties and essentially 
the same population as the loyal red counties.  They are more diverse racially 
than the red counties, but a good deal less diverse than the blue counties.  On 
percent white, percent black and percent Hispanic, the swing counties are more 
like the red counties than the more diverse blue counties. 
Their median home value and per capita income are less than the deep 
blue counties and somewhat larger than the deep red counties.  Their median 
household income is almost the same as the loyal Democratic base and the loyal 
Republican base. Their percent below the poverty line fits almost exactly between 
the two partisan types as the swing counties are at 3.5 percent below the blue 
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counties and 2.5 percent above the red counties.  If the swing counties are 
candidates ripe for a conversion to the Republican side, their demographic make-
up would most resemble the red counties already.  But they mostly fit between 
the two polar types and thus they will probably continue to provide potential 
movement to either side and help provide the margin of victory in any particular 
election.   The swing counties will continue to provide change in Illinois politics 
while the partisan base counties will provide the continuity that is so evident 
when the state’s entire map is considered.   
The income disparities we found in these Illinois counties are also indicative 
of some of the economic disparities which were important markers for the 
national presidential results in 2016 as well.  A study done after the election by 
the Brookings Institution revealed the following about the Trump and Clinton 
coalitions and the economic base to this deep division:  
“The less than 500 counties that Clinton carried nationwide encompassed a 
massive 64% of America’s economic activity as measured by total output in 2015.  
By contrast the more than 2,000 counties that Donald Trump won generated just 
36% of the country’s output- just a little more than one-third of the nation’s 
economic activity…. You can see very clearly that with the exceptions of Phoenix 
and Fort Worth areas and a big chunk of Long Island Clinton won every large-sized 
county economy in the country.  Her base of 493 counties was heavily 
metropolitan. By contrast, Trumpland consists of hundreds and hundreds of tiny 
low-output locations that compromise the non-metropolitan hinterland of 
America, along with some suburban and exurban metro counties…In the end, our 
data makes plain that while cultural resentments played a huge role in this 
month’s election, so too did a massive economic divide between relatively 
prosperous high-output counties and struggling lower out{put} rural ones” (Muro 
and Liu, November 29, 2016; See also: Tankersley, November 22, 2016).   
The report further showed that those counties with the higher GDP per 
capita incomes and those with the most population density were much more 
likely to vote for Clinton and those at the opposite ends of the income and 
population continuum were where Trump carried overwhelmingly.   
This is not a recent division in American politics and in many respects it is 
an echo of the ancient divisions which roiled the debate over the ratification of 
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the constitution, the power of the central government, states’ rights and tariff 
policies in the era of the founders.  For example, the Northeast was deeply 
divided against the South, especially Virginia in the earliest government under 
George Washington. The northeastern states generally favored a strong central 
government and high tariffs while the south favored states’ rights and low tariffs.   
The philosophical debates, and practical politics which divided New Yorker, 
Alexander Hamilton, against Virginians, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 
helped shape the early days of the republic and they drove the fundamental 
conflicts and compromises embedded in the constitution.  These divisions also 
exacerbated the conflict which led to the Civil War. It is a division which seems to 
have grown more clearly polarized in recent decades and to have reached an 
extreme in the 2016 elections.   
Urban demographer, Richard Florida provides a further elaboration on the 
economic base of the Trump victory nationally in the following assessment: 
“U. S. metro areas house more than 85 percent of the nation’s population 
and generate 90 percent of its economic output….Donald Trump won many more 
metros, 259 to 122, than Hillary Clinton.  But Clinton captured a greater share of 
the metro vote, 51 percent compared to 44% for Trump.  Metro areas accounted 
for 85 percent of total votes, 110 million of roughly 130 million total.  Clinton 
captured the largest metros.  She bested Trump with 55 percent compared to 40 
percent of the vote in metros with more than one million people, and won eight 
of the ten largest metros.  These metros accounted for more than half the vote 
and generate two-thirds of America’s economic output…. The average Clinton 
metro is home to almost 1.4 million people, more than three times the size of the 
average Trump metro, which is about 420,000.  And outside of metropolitan 
areas, Trump beat Clinton… by 67 percent compared to 29 percent in rural areas… 
(Florida, November 29, 2016).  
In Illinois, the metropolitan areas are mostly found in northeastern Illinois, 
in Chicago and the suburbs. Both Cook County and DuPage County were included 
in the high economic output counties that Muro and Liu wrote about in their 
study for Brookings. We have already noted the deep divisions in Illinois between 
the Chicago area and the more rural and small city areas of the state in the 
Clinton versus Trump race results.  In many ways the appeal to regional loyalties 
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has been the signature urban versus rural division that has marked Illinois for 
generations and which seem to be increasing in depth and bitterness.  It is now a 
given that Illinois political campaigns outside Chicagoland will be powered by 
appeals to the pervasive and deep seated suspicion, distrust and dislike of 
Chicago and its most prominent leaders.  
 In southern Illinois, for example, office seekers from both parties will 
routinely and vehemently state their determination to “stand up to Chicago” or 
“fight the Chicago machine” or some other emphatic declaration indicating their 
determination to focus their fight on the perceived dominance of the city and to 
throw off the yoke of having to carry the city’s burdens whether those are 
budgetary or regulatory.  The fact that the last three governors, one Republican 
and two Democrats, have come from Chicago lends credence to this charge.  In 
addition, the fact that the Speaker of the House, Michael J. Madigan, has held his 
office for 31 of the past 33 years certainly provides a prominent target for 
downstate politicians to blame.  
 In this last election the whole campaign in many legislative districts boiled 
down to a proxy war between Governor Rauner and Speaker Madigan.  Most of 
the television commercials, and the ubiquitous campaign mailers brought that 
narrative into the homes of Illinois voters on a daily basis. Those ads were often 
explicitly directed against Chicago and the political leaders from there and also 
contained explicit ways in which the opponent had “sold out” to Chicago.   
The people in the heartland outside the city are often told by their leaders 
that Chicago gets “more than their share” of the state budget and other 
resources.  This refrain is certainly deeply embedded in the culture of southern 
Illinois and it is a staple of campaigns for both parties.  It is not particularly 
relevant whether this charge is fact based, and most budgetary experts do not 
believe that it is.  Such systematic empirical studies that have been done show 
that Chicago pays more into the state’s coffers than they receive back in state 
compensation (Legislative Research Unit, 1989; Perlstein, December 4, 2016, 1; 
Rado, December 4, 2016, 1-A).  Those studies show the predictable result, which 
is that those areas which are more prosperous, and have the highest incomes, pay 
disproportionately into the state’s coffers on the revenue side.  On the 
expenditure side, those studies also show that many of the state aid formulas are 
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geared toward those individuals and areas which have low incomes and a greater 
need. Thus, the formulas work to the advantage of the more rural and low income 
areas and work also to the advantage of low income areas of the city of Chicago.  
But the more prosperous areas of the city and the suburbs often pay more than 
they receive in return. 
This picture of rampant regionalism is also a microcosm of the nation as a 
whole and is one key to what happened nationally in the 2016 presidential 
campaign. Scholars have long noted that the red states are usually the recipients 
of a disproportionate share of federal funds while the blue states are often the 
disproportionate donors (WalletHub, March 27, 2014; Merda, March 26, 2014; 
Illinois Economic Policy Institute, August 21, 2015).  Ironically, the red states are 
usually the more conservative states where the distrust and suspicion of the 
federal government is greatest and support for smaller government and less 
government spending is strongest.    
This disparity is because of higher incomes and the more prosperous urban 
areas pay more income and other taxes and the programmatic distribution 
formulas usually take need into account. In addition defense department 
spending is usually higher in the red states than in the blue states. They are home 
to more defense industries and to more military bases.  This is one reason Illinois, 
for example, is a donor state that pays $1.36 in federal taxes for each federal 
dollar it gets back (Progress Illinois, February 10, 2015).  This anomaly demands 
some attempt to understand why the rural areas feel so strongly that they are not 
getting their “fair share” and why they feel exploited by the urban areas where 
there are often pockets of poverty, crime and joblessness that rivals anything 
experienced in the most deprived of our rural areas where the need is also great 
for some people.  
A recent book by political scientist, Katherine J. Cramer, offers some 
important clues to understanding the anomaly of urban versus rural conflict and 
pervasive feelings of anxiety and economic threat in the rural areas.  She studied 
her state of Wisconsin trying to understand the phenomenon of Governor Scott 
Walker and his battles with the state’s civil servants and unions.  This included the 
impeachment vote in 2012, led by the state’s public sector unions whom Walker 
had targeted for a greatly diminished role in state government with restrictions 
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on their power passed entirely with the support of a Republican majority in the 
state legislature and over the very strong objections of the Democrats (Cramer, 
2016).   
This fight led to a recall election, which Walker won, with the help of 
campaign funds from the Koch brothers among other out of state sources, the 
first time an American governor had successfully fended off such a recall 
challenge.  This victory, then made Walker something of a hero in conservative 
and Republican Party circles and led in turn to his seeking the Republican 
nomination for president in 2016 although he did not get very far.   
Cramer is a Wisconsin native, who has lived most of her life in the state and 
was educated in the state’s schools and now teaches political science at the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison.  Given that background, she was well aware of 
the state’s political culture which included a constant tension between Madison 
and Milwaukee versus the more rural outstate regions.  The rural areas and some 
of the suburbs of Milwaukee became the bastion of the pro Walker and anti-
union battle that took place in the recall election and that division still marks 
much of Wisconsin’s political culture. It is also a key to an understanding of 
Clinton’s unexpected loss of Wisconsin to Trump in 2016 despite the fact that that 
state had not voted Republican in the presidential races since 1984.    
Veteran observers of the political scene in Illinois will be impressed with 
just how similar that rural versus urban dynamic in Wisconsin is to the major 
divisions and narratives which move the political tides in Illinois.  The rural/urban 
divide is, if anything, more long standing and deeper in Illinois than in Wisconsin.  
Cramer undertook a long running series of in depth conversations with the people 
of the rural areas of her home state to try to understand why they had so much 
fear and distrust of the two major cities of their state.  What she found was a 
constant refrain of what she called a “rural consciousness” i.e. a strong emphasis 
on the place where the people live and how much their own identities were 
wrapped up in their native regions, their home towns, and their sense of who 
they were personally being defined by the culture of where they live. At the 
aggregate level, Cramer maintains that this has become a sort of “rural identity 
politics” which goes to the essence of how people personally identify themselves 
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and how they think of their place in the world. Anyone who has spent much time 
listening to country music will immediately recognize this story.   
  This is a refrain that is also found in other major works which have tried to 
untangle the dynamics of the profound geographical divisions which have marked 
recent history in our polarized nation (Bishop, 2008; Frey, December 13, 2016). 
We tend to live in geographic enclaves that help define who we are politically and 
how we vote as well.  One cannot view the red versus blue maps of recent 
presidential elections, especially the 2016 results, and not be struck by just how 
indelibly geography and regionalism have come to mark our electoral fate. 
It would be hard to overestimate how much what Cramer terms “the 
politics of resentment” fueled the Trump surge which carried him to victory in the 
nation as well as in ninety of the one hundred and two Illinois counties. His 
rhetoric was stark, unvarnished, and ultimately remarkably effective. In the 
Trump narrative immigrants or Mexicans or the Chinese were coming to get your 
job, and some were criminals who could take your life.  Urban black people lived 
in hellish ghettoes marred by dysfunctional schools and no economic opportunity, 
drugs, gangs and violence which constantly threatened to spill over to your more 
prosperous suburban or rural homes and life.  Political and economic elites 
negotiated trade agreements which flittered away American jobs and prosperity 
with no gains for Americans in return.  International elites lured us into 
international environmental agreements to reduce carbon dioxide at the expense 
of carbon based extractive jobs in the coal and oil businesses at home.  The media 
and Hollywood elites controlled television and the movies that purveyed new 
cultural images and norms which undermined your family values and threatened 
your freedom of religion.  Your free speech rights are constantly threatened by 
political correctness. Welfare cheats are getting free cell phones compliments of 
Obama and getting free healthcare thanks to Obamacare.   
Finally, the perennial NRA threat that someone, Obama and next Clinton, is 
coming to get your guns and confiscate them so some nebulous national 
dictatorship or world government can be established.  This story is always being 
pushed by the NRA and other gun rights groups, even though there is no evidence 
that Obama took away any guns during the eight years he was president. Clinton 
repeatedly stressed her support for the Second Amendment during the debates, 
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although she did consider the possibility of closing the gun show loopholes and 
restricting gun magazine capacities as small steps toward trying to control gun 
violence, particularly involving children. Trump often pledged his total allegiance 
to the 2nd Amendment and promised that no one would tamper with it if he was 
president. Unrestrained gun rights, rather than Medicare or Social Security, may 
have become the new “third rail” of American electoral politics especially in the 
more rural and small town precincts of the country. 
   None of these narratives have to be true, or to have more than a small 
kernel of facts to back them up, to nevertheless be remarkably effective from a 
rhetorical standpoint in convincing the recipients of the message and to reinforce 
the inchoate attitudes that are already in place for millions of voters. That is why 
the politics of resentment apparently proved to be such fertile ground with an 
audience of tens of millions during the 2016 campaign.   
When the 2016 race for the White House started this narrative was already 
out there in the nation deeply engrained and shared widely in private 
conversations and exploding in the new social media. All Trump had to do initially 
was to articulate it and spread it directly and immediately especially through his 
own unprecedented and aggressive use of the social media.  He was especially 
adept at delivering his message through his unmediated and wildly successful use 
of Twitter- a channel which carried his words without interruption or filter to an 
audience which numbered twenty million personal followers by his own report 
and tens of millions more in the larger mainstream media and an internet based 
audience which heard what he had to say posted directly every day of the 
campaign.  Trump’s clarion call to the politics of resentment struck a mass nerve 
for many of the more than sixty million people who voted for him on November 
8th.  As the map has shown, many millions of those voters were in the rural, small 
town and small city precincts of America.   
Digging below the fact of the division that she observed in Wisconsin well 
before Trump’s arrival on the national scene, Cramer tried to respectfully 
understand the rural informants she interviewed and to fathom the depths of 
their mistrust and dislike of their city cousins.  In these interviews, she 
consistently encountered a narrative containing a core of this politics of 
resentment.  It was anchored in an “us versus them” conviction that the two 
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worlds were greatly different and that the city people were getting more than 
their share while the rural people were getting the short end of the stick.  This 
made them resent government and to want less government, whether state or 
national, because the major beneficiaries of government would be the urban 
areas and the undeserving people who lived in them.  The conviction that 
immigrants and minorities were taking most of whatever there was to get from 
governmental programs made them want to reduce the size and scope of 
government at all levels.   
Again, never mind that those were not the empirical facts in Wisconsin; the 
people Cramer interviewed took them as indisputable truths that they 
understood clearly.  Those “facts” are especially reinforced in the public’s minds 
when some of their leaders are elected on platforms that promise to take care of 
the forgotten places and people and to reduce the power of the political elites 
who perpetuate a system which is rigged against the alienated and distrustful 
voters.  Scott Walker himself had been the chief executive of the county 
Milwaukee is located in before he was elected governor, but he successfully 
mobilized this mistrust toward and resentment of the urban areas in his two 
elections for governor and in his recall fight.   
Cramer summarizes her major thesis in the following terms:   
“This book shows making sense of politics in a way that places resentment 
toward other citizens at the center.  It illuminates this politics of resentment by 
looking closely at the manner in which many rural residents exhibit an intense 
resentment against their urban counterparts…. I explain how people make sense 
of politics when the boundaries they draw between ‘us’ and ‘them’ coincides with 
real geographic boundaries.  I show that although this form of thinking is often 
criticized as ignorance, these understandings are complex, many layered, and 
grounded in fundamental identities” (Cramer, 2016, Chapter 1).   
One need not be a political expert or even an aficionado or political junkie 
to be struck by how well Cramer’s thesis fits Illinois politics.  The narrative that 
many of our ills are the fault of Chicago, the “machine,” or the leaders we elect 
from Chicago is a powerful one in much of Downstate.  It has been vividly 
reinforced by tens of millions of campaign dollars spent on purveying that 
narrative in the 2016 elections.  It is a narrative that has deep roots in southern 
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Illinois, for example, but also throughout the rest of Downstate.  Regionalism, an 
appeal to the sense of neglect of the locals and of “us versus them” has a 
powerful appeal as anyone who spent any amount of time viewing the flood of 
political ads on broadcast or cable television, or even in front of a computer 
screen or on a smart phone can attest.  Indeed, in the southern Illinois media 
market which covers much of southeast Missouri and western Kentucky, it is a 
narrative repeated with even more color and vehemence in those neighboring 
states. The politics of regionalism in Illinois looks strikingly like the contours of 
politics in Wisconsin described in Cramer’s meticulously researched book.   
Conclusion 
Which returns the discussion back to the recently concluded national 
elections.  The thesis of this paper is that Illinois is a good microcosm of national 
tides by virtue of its standing as a bellwether state and one of the most 
representative of all the states in demographic, economic, and political indicators.  
The fact that Hillary Clinton won her native state handily while losing the 
presidency does not diminish this important distinction for Illinois.  Our 
population distribution closely reflects the national distribution; our economy has 
exhibited and suffered from the same strains and dislocations that have 
challenged the national economy in a time of globalized competition and our 
recent demographic changes are a bellwether for the nation.  Our political parties 
and factions and interest group complex are very much like their national 
counterparts. 
The argument of the last section of this paper is that the regionalism and 
geographic divisions overlay and reinforce the political divisions.  In the 
presidential elections geography is destiny because the Electoral College requires 
a state coalition based voting majority rather than a majority of the popular votes 
and emphasizes the power of the Electoral College to overturn the will of a 
majority or plurality of the people.  In short, most Americans have learned in two 
of the most recent presidential elections that unlike all other elections in this 
country, the candidate who gets the most votes does not necessarily win the 
prize. 
One cannot view the red and blue national map and not be impressed, or 
depressed, by the deep geographic and regional divisions which marked the 2016 
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election results.  If the lens is taken out to a wider angle, one cannot view all the 
presidential results in the modern era without being impressed by how much the 
realignment of the political parties has congealed and hardened into maturity and 
the ideological and cultural wars have served to reflect and exacerbate the deep 
divisions in a now polarized country.   
Certainly the divided results of 2016, with Trump winning a handy victory in 
the Electoral College while Clinton took a substantial popular vote margin, will 
continue to emphasize and exacerbate those divisions.  The divisive rhetoric of 
that campaign will not go away if and when the tone in Washington softens in 
service to the need to govern.  The divisions are deep and will only be reduced 
and ameliorated when there are tangible results where the system seems to be 
more responsive and the economic and social benefits are unmistakably the 
product of a government which serves the greater good and the interests of the 
greatest number of the people.   
In the wake of the 2016 results there is a developing national dialogue 
about the Electoral College and whether it is outmoded and ought to be repealed.  
This dialogue also developed in 2000 when the same divided results put George 
W. Bush in the White House despite his losing the popular vote by some 537,000 
votes.  The vagaries of the Electoral College, the Florida recount, and the 
intervention of the U. S. Supreme Court were more complex than the rather 
direct and swift settlement of the presidential election in 2016, but the final result 
was the same. Clinton’s popular vote margin was much wider than Gore’s, but her 
Electoral College loss was also much larger. In fact the discrepancy between the 
popular vote and the electoral vote and the disadvantage to the popular vote 
winner has never been as great as it was in 2016.   
There will be a continued national interest in doing away with the Electoral 
College, mostly led by the Democrats and liberals who believe that the 18th 
Century device denies majority rule, one of the bedrock tenants of democracy 
(Editorial Board, New York Times, December 19, 2016).  However, there is 
virtually no chance that this drive to delete the Electoral College from the 
constitution will succeed in the foreseeable future.  The Electoral College has 
unfailingly worked to the advantage of the Republican Party in all cases where it 
chose the president except 1824 when the Republican Party did not exist.  The 
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two modern cases, 2000 and 2016, both produced Republican presidents over 
Democratic candidates who had won the popular vote as did the elections of 
1876 and 1888.  Because their votes are distributed so much more efficiently 
across the states, there is an inherent and long term bias in the Republicans’ 
favor.  The Electoral College votes are allotted on population as reflected in the 
number of House members a state has, but that is supplemented by two votes for 
each state to represent the Senate numbers.  Thus, voters in a small state like 
Montana, for example, are worth more in the total equation than are the voters 
in the larger states like California and New York.  This advantage to the rural and 
small states is built in and works to one party’s advantage. This advantage is most 
important and most marked in the U. S. Senate, but it also counts in the Electoral 
College.     
One of the most influential textbooks in the field describes the situation in 
the following manner: 
“…the ten smallest states, with 3 percent of the total voters in the 2012 
presidential election, maintain voting weight in the Senate equal to the ten 
largest states, home to 50 percent of the voters in 2012.  The small states’ 
disproportionate share of senators guarantees them slight overrepresentation in 
the electoral college as well.  After the 2010 census, the seven states casting three 
electoral votes each had a ratio of 331,472 or fewer residents per electoral vote, 
while every state with thirteen or more electoral votes had a ratio of 607,972 or 
more residents per electoral vote” (Polsby, Wildavsky, Schier, and Hopkins, 2016, 
220). 
This book goes on to add, however, that because the small states are 
mostly one party states, it is the swing states or the most competitive states 
which get the most campaign attention and the most resources because they can 
and often do shift the balance of power in a competitive election (See also: 
Edwards, November 18, 2016).  Thus the battleground states get the candidate 
attention and campaign expenditures that all of the other states would like to 
have.   
Since it takes thirty-eight states to amend the constitution, the Electoral 
College is certainly safe as a fundamental rule about how we elect American 
presidents.  In addition, philosophically the Republicans and conservatives 
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contend that the Electoral College helps protect and foster federalism since a 
candidate must win a coalition of states which produces a majority of electors 
rather than a majority (or plurality) of the popular votes.  The polarization of 
American politics will continue to be driven in part by the uneven distribution of 
the national vote results across very urban versus very rural states and regions 
within the states which the Electoral College magnifies.   
Both parties will be challenged by those deep-seated differences as they try 
to chart their own futures and plan for the future of the nation under a newly 
unified Republican government. In fact unified Republican control of the 
government is likely to be a much more important driver of the changes that 
Trump promised than is his singular election will be. Given their different national 
power equations now, the challenges to the two major parties will be quite 
different also.  The Democrats have a profound long-term challenge to rebuild 
across all levels of government and in all the states and regions where they lost 
ground in 2016 and 2012.  They must try to overcome some of those broad based 
losses and try to expand their appeal to the voters, especially the millions who 
claimed that they were angry toward their government, and took out that anger 
on the Democrats generically and Hillary Clinton specifically in 2016. They will also 
have to greatly improve their appeal to blue collar workers and the growing 
numbers of people who work in the service industries, whether blue collar or 
white collar, which increasingly dominate our economy. 
 The Democrats will have to face the inevitable struggle of the two wings 
where the left, under the leadership of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren will 
try to take the party in a more markedly progressive direction.  The liberals will 
often be opposed by the more pragmatic and middle of the road leaders who 
once were represented by Bill Clinton and Al Gore’s taking the party toward the 
middle or what was called “the Third Way” and trying to accommodate the  
seemingly irreconcilable demands of Wall Street and Main Street.  
The results of the 2016 election make it clear that the Democrats will have 
to learn to appeal to more white voters, more male voters, and older voters 
demographically.  Geographically, they will have to find a way to appeal again to 
the rural areas and to small town America. Clearly the rural areas cannot be 
ceded to the Republicans permanently without doing real damage to the long 
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term prospects of the Democratic Party, especially in the House, and ensuring the 
continued deep polarization of the nation (Jaffey, November 28, 2016; Roarty, 
November 29, 2016).  
 The Democrats will also have to refresh and reinforce their message to the 
traditional blue states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, and also to the 
swing states like Florida and Ohio that they will need for success in future 
presidential elections.  There are a number of “purple states” like Colorado, 
Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and Virginia where the Democrats must build on 
some of their recent state and national successes.  They have also recently found 
a sympathetic audience in many parts of suburban America, and especially among 
the growing number of better educated and young voters. Those are the Collar 
Counties in Illinois and almost all states have some version of these vote rich and 
growing suburban areas which were once Republican bastions, but which are now 
much more diverse and trending at least purple and sometimes blue in many 
areas.   Those are key components for any plan for a return to majority status and 
control of any measure of political power for the Democrats.    
They must rebuild the party at the state level where their losses are 
especially widespread and where those losses will have results throughout the 
decade of 2020-2030 if the Democrats do not start rebuilding at the state and 
local levels in anticipation of the need to gain control of the redistricting process 
in a wider number of states than they have had since the 2010 election losses 
which devastated the Democrats at the grassroots level. To do this they cannot 
give up on rural, small town and small city America since those areas are so 
important for the state legislative and congressional seats that are essential for 
the party’s future-particularly when the 2021 redistricting battles take place.   
 Somehow the Democrats have to refocus the constant ‘zero sum game’ 
mentality which has taken control of many voters, the parties, the media and the 
nation.  That is, they have to convince larger numbers of people that when the 
government works well, and public programs are effective and produce tangible 
gains everyone prospers. This is an old message about the irreplaceable functions 
of the government that cannot and will not be supplied by the private sector.  
Such a message should have particular appeal to the middle class and working 
class constituencies that the Democrats traditionally served.   More importantly, 
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they have to convince more voters that this message about the importance of 
government for ordinary people is based in reality and that their interest and the 
national interest do not have to be in fundamental conflict constantly. This was 
the message of the Clinton campaign, summarized in her “Stronger Together” 
motto, but they failed to deliver it in a convincing form for tens of millions of 
voters who had favored the Democrats as recently as Bill Clinton’s two terms and 
even through Obama’s terms, but who did not hear a compelling reason to stay 
the course with Hillary Clinton.   
Right now the challenge to the Republicans is much easier to manage and 
more long range than immediate.  Nothing succeeds like success in politics and 
the GOP enjoyed major successes at both the national level and in many states on 
November 8th.  The Republicans will not be marked by the deep internal divisions 
that clearly existed before the presidential election because their side and Trump 
won. Republican leaders who stridently opposed and criticized him before the 
election are now rushing to make amends and some are being touted as new 
members of his cabinet.   
 Trump might have said, “recrimination is for losers,” (but didn’t so far as I 
know).  The Republican leaders, especially Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell, will go 
along because they want to get along with their new party leader, Donald Trump. 
Whether they like it or not, the Chief Executive is also the Chief of the Party. The 
legislative leaders have a long list of laws and policy demands that they want 
implemented immediately, starting with the repeal of the Affordable Care Act on 
the domestic front and repeal of the Iranian nuclear deal and the Paris climate 
control agreement on the international front.   The legislative leaders will help 
Trump drive the Republican agenda and define the new Republican Party.  The 
proof will be in whether they succeed in governing with a broad constituency in 
mind and whether Donald Trump will prove to be as capable at governing, and 
learning the art of compromise and adopting a give and take style as he was in 
campaigning and defining a new norm for what constitutes presidential politics in 
21st Century America.  We will see.  Time will tell.    
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2012 Illinois Presidential Election Results by County
Romney
Obama
# of Votes
2,135,216
3,019,512
  
% of Votes
40.73%
57.60%
  
Counties Carried
- Romney      N=79
- Obama        N=23
 Source: Basic data taken from Illinois State Board of Elections
Ocial Vote, November 6, 2012, 5.
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Illinois Counties Carried by Obama in 2012 and 2008 and lost by Clinton in 2016.
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Illinois Counties Carried by Obama in 2008, lost in 2012 and lost by Clinton in 2016.
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CLINTON LOST 2016
CLINTON WON
CARRIED BY OBAMA IN 
2008, BUT LOST IN 2012
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The Most Loyal Democratic Counties: 2000-2016, Voted Democratic
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The Most Loyal Republican Counties: 2000-2016, voted GOP
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LEGEND
REPUBLICAN
DEMOCRAT
Illinois Presidential Popular 
Vote by County in 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
*Voted Democrat at least one election
** Voted Republican each election, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 
(except Franklin and Perry who voted for Gore in 2000 and then 
consistently for the GOP starting in 2004.)
County
2010 
Population % White
% 
Black
% 
Hispanic
Median 
Home Value
Per Capita 
Income
Median Household 
Income
% below 
Poverty
Cook 5,194,675 66.0 25.0 24.4 256,900 29,920 54,598 15.8
Rock Island 147,546 85.9 9.3 11.9 113,100 25,609 46,726 12.4
Peoria 186,494 75.7 17.9 4.0 121,900 28,743 50,689 15.4
Champaign 201,081 74.9 12.7 5.5 147,800 25,226 44,462 21.8
St. Clair 270,056 65.8 30.5 3.4 126,300 25,475 50,109 16.3
Jackson 60,218 78.5 14.7 4.3 95,100 19,619 32,896 29.1
Average 1,010,012 74.5 18.4 8.9 143,517 25,765 46,580 18.5
*Note: These counties voted for the Democratic presidential Candidate 2000-2016
Appendix H
Demographic Characteristics of the Most Consistently Democratic Counties*
County
2010 
Population
% 
White
% 
Black
% 
Hispanic
Median 
Home Value
Per Capita 
Income
Median Household 
Income
% Below 
Poverty
Adams 67,103         93.9 3.6 1.3 99,900          24,798       45,792                         12.7        
Bond 17,768         91.3 6.5 3.2 107,300        24,166       50,672                         10.5        
Brown 6,937            78.6 19.0 5.9 80,000          19,704       42,014                         12.1        
Christian 34,800         96.7 1.7 1.5 82,000          3,125          43,964                         15.8        
Clark 16,335         98.2 0.5 1.3 84,700          24,388       47,933                         10.2        
Clay 13,815         97.9 0.5 1.3 71,500          21,577       38,905                         16.9        
Clinton 37,762         94.3 3.8 2.9 125,200        26,380       57,246                         8.0          
Crawford 19,817         93.3 4.9 2.1 70,000          23,387       43,923                         16.4        
Cumberland 11,048         98.0 0.7 0.9 82,100          21,715       43,255                         13.1        
Dewitt 16,561         97.5 0.7 2.2 104,400        25,914       48,750                         7.9          
Douglas 19,900         97.7 0.6 6.4 95,000          22,339       47,921                         10.2        
Edgar 18,576         98.3 0.6 1.2 72,400          23,897       42,947                         14.9        
Edwards 6,721            98.0 0.7 1.0 61,500          20,907       39,071                         11.5        
Effingham 34,242         98.2 0.4 1.9 108,100        25,566       50,938                         10.7        
Fayetteville 22,140         93.9 4.6 1.5 78,400          22,419       43,081                         16.8        
Ford 14,081         97.6 0.9 2.4 89,900          25,302       50,332                         9.2          
*Franklin 39,561         97.7 0.5 1.4 63,200          19,668       36,383                         18.5        
Greene 13,886         97.8 1.1 0.9 71,800          22,366       42,193                         12.8        
Hamilton 8,457            98.1 0.6 1.4 74,100          22,471       39,000                         10.0        
Hancock 19,104         98.0 0.4 1.1 81,700          23,027       43,567                         12.8        
Hardin 4,320            97.5 0.5 1.4 65,700          18,749       30,875                         23.8        
Iroquois 29,718         97.2 1.0 5.7 99,400          24,563       48,248                         11.5        
Jasper 9,698            98.4 0.3 0.9 82,700          22,917       47,731                         7.6          
Jefferson 38,827         88.7 8.7 2.2 87,000          22,032       42,679                         17.2        
Jersey 22,985         97.5 0.5 1.1 120,800        24,940       54,469                         8.9          
Johnson 12,582         89.9 8.5 3.1 93,400          17,328       42,172                         11.6        
Lawrence 16,833         88.5 10.0 3.5 68,300          17,050       38,326                         16.2        
Lee 36,031         92.4 5.2 5.1 114,700        25,303       49,451                         9.5          
Livingston 38,950         92.8 5.2 4.1 105,600        23,530       52,835                         10.7        
Logan 30,305         89.8 7.9 3.1 95,700          22,136       48,714                         11.1        
Marion 39,437         93.5 4.1 1.5 71,300          21,418       40,097                         16.5        
Marshall 12,640         98.0 0.5 2.7 103,200        25,600       51,642                         9.3          
Massac 15,429         91.5 5.9 2.0 80,500          20,044       40,885                         16.7        
Menard 12,705         97.6 0.9 1.1 115,200        26,300       56,943                         7.9          
Monroe 32,957         98.1 0.4 1.4 201,300        31,570       69,291                         5.6          
Morgan 35,547         91.2 6.3 2.2 93,000          23,598       44,731                         15.0        
Moultrie 14,846         98.3 0.5 1.0 93,000          24,078       48,982                         10.5        
Ogle 53,497         89.8 1.1 9.1 153,400        25,803       57,094                         10.3        
*Perry 22,350         88.9 8.8 2.8 76,600          18,469       41,333                         17.0        
Piatt 16,729         97.9 0.6 1.2 122,200        27,452       58,837                         6.5          
Pike 16,430         96.9 1.8 1.1 75,300          20,383       40,668                         16.2        
Pope 4,470            91.4 6.7 1.5 87,400          20,603       38,651                         11.9        
Randolph 33,476         88.4 10.0 2.7 88,700          21,442       46,148                         12.4        
Richland 16,233         97.3 0.7 1.4 7,600             23,922       42,305                         13.4        
Saline 24,913         93.0 4.3 1.6 69,400          21,626       36,083                         17.0        
Scott 5,355            98.6 0.2 0.9 83,100          27,955       50,702                         8.0          
Shelby 22,363         98.5 0.5 1.0 86,500          22,522       44,689                         10.5        
Appendix I
Demographic Characteristics of the Most Loyal Republican Counties
County
2010 
Population % White % Black % Hispanic
Median Home 
Value
Per Capita 
Income
Median Household 
Income
% Below 
Poverty
Alexander 8,238 60.9 35.4 1.9 52,800 14,052 25,495 35.6
Carroll 15,387 96.9 0.8 2.8 97,000 26,918 49,629 12.6
Fulton 37,069 93.4 3.4 2.4 81,300 22,478 45,938 16.5
Henderson 7,331 98.2 0.2 1.1 86,300 27,132 48,438 11.7
Henry 50,486 94.8 1.6 4.8 110,100 26,845 52,518 11.3
Jo Davies 22,678 97.2 0.5 2.7 137,200 29,477 52,065 10.7
Knox 52,919 87.5 7.2 4.8 80,800 22,273 39,800 19.3
Mercer 16,434 98.3 0.3 1.9 93,700 26,739 51,259 9.6
Putnam 6,006 96.6 0.5 4.2 123,800 28,158 55,360 8.9
Warren 17,707 91.3 1.7 8.4 82,000 22,923 43,683 13.5
Whiteside 58,498 92.2 1.3 11.0 99,200 24,815 48,343  12.2
Average 26,614 91.6 4.8 4.2 94,927 24,710 46,593 15.0
Appendix J
Illinois Counties Carried by Obama in 2012 and Lost by Clinton in 2016
Note: All above data was obtained from the 2010 Census conducted by the US Census Bureau
Note: Obama carried 23 counties in 2012: Clinton carried 11 in 2016
